





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Updated August 22, 2014 
 







7:00am Registration and Continental Breakfast (Hemingway Pre-Function) 
 
8:00am Morning and All Day Training Sessions Begin 
● Bro Platform Training Workshop 
● Developing Cybersecurity Programs for NSF Projects 
● Vulnerabilities, Threats, and Secure Coding Practices 
 




12:00pm Lunch provided 
 
1:00pm Afternoon Training Sessions Begin and All Day Training Sessions Resume 
● Bro Platform Training Workshop (continued) 
● HPC, HIPAA, and FISMA: Meeting the Regulatory Challenge through Effective 
Risk Management 
● Incident Response Training 
 




5:00pm Sessions End 
 














7:00am Sign-In and Continental Breakfast (Pre-Function C) 
 
8:00am Welcome and Goals (Jim Marsteller) 
 
8:10am NSF Address: 
Irene Qualters, Division Director of Advanced Cyberinfrastructure (ACI) 
 
8:30am Keynote Address:  
Dr. Phyllis Schneck, Deputy Under Secretary for Cybersecurity,  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
 
9:30am Coffee Break 
 
10:00am Panel:  
Large Facilities’ Cybersecurity Challenges & Successes 
Panelists:  Steve Barnet (IceCube), Bret Goodrich (DKIST), Cliff Jacobs, Bill Kramer 
(Blue Waters) 
Moderator:  Amy Northcutt (NSF) 
 
11:00am NSF/ACI Perspective on Cybersecurity (Anita Nikolich) 
 
11:20am CTSC Observations, Perspective, and Vision (Von Welch) 
 
11:40am NSF Bro Center for Expertise (Robin Sommer)  
 
12:00pm Lunch and Table Topics - Lunch provided 
 
1:00pm Case Study:  
Curbing Abusive Behavior in Science Gateways  
(Pascal Meunier, HUBzero) 
 
1:30pm Case Study: 
Cybersecurity Operations in a Multi-Institutional Academic Setting: The NEES Story 
(Saurabh Bagchi, Fahad Ali Arshad, Gaspar Modelo-Howard) 
 
2:00pm Panel: 
Privacy Concerns at Large Research Facilities 
Panelists:  Mike Corn (Brandeis U.), Celeste Matarazzo (LLNL), Nigel Sharp (NSF), Heidi 
Wachs (Gartner) 
Moderators:  Ardoth Hassler (Georgetown U.), Rodney Petersen (EDUCAUSE) 
 
3:00pm Coffee Break 
 
3:30pm Case Study: 





4:00pm Case Study: 
Managing Security Policies for Federated Cyberinfrastructure (Stephen Schwab and 
John Wroclawski, USC ISI) 
 
4:30pm Open Discussion / Summary of the Day’s Findings  
(Von Welch, Craig Jackson, Jim Marsteller) 
 
5:00pm Adjourn for the Day 
 
Evening: Dinner on your own.  






7:00am Sign-In and Continental Breakfast (Pre-Function C) 
 
7:50am Welcome Back (Jim Marsteller) 
 
8:00am Keynote Address:  
Matthew Rosenquist, Cyber Security Strategist, Intel 
“Strategic Leadership for Managing Evolving Cybersecurity Risks” 
 
9:00am Panel: 
Threat Profile for NSF Large Facilities and Cyberinfrastructure 
Panelists:  Amy Butler (GWU), Jeremy Epstein (NSF), David Halstead (NRAO), Matthew 
Rosenquist (Intel) 
Moderator:  David Raymond (Army Cyber Institute, U.S. Military Academy) 
 
10:00am Coffee Break 
 
10:30am Panel: 
The Role of Information Sharing in Large Facility Security 
Panelists: Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld (UIUC), Jim Marsteller (PSC), Kim Milford 
(REN-ISAC), Abe Singer (LIGO) 
Moderator:  Greg Bell (ESNet) 
 
11:30am Open Discussion / Summary of Summit Findings  






















































Jared Allar is a Pittsburgh Supercomputer Center information security analyst. His background covers 
many aspects of information security including vulnerability discovery, vulnerability coordination, 
security evaluations of information systems, and incident response. He has done information 




Amy Apon is Chair of the Computer Science Division in the School of Computing at Clemson 
University. She is the current Past Chair of the Coalition for Academic Scientific Computation (CASC), 
an organization of nearly 80 U.S. academic institutions who are leaders in computational and 
data-enabled science and engineering.  Apon does research in high performance computing clusters 
and infrastructure for collaborative computing and is leading several initiatives to expand graduate 
education and research, including the CI SEEDS project, funded by NSF, that is increasing the number 
of domestic Ph.D. students in areas of data-enabled science at Clemson University.   Dr. Apon holds a 
Ph.D. in Computer Science from Vanderbilt University and Masters and Bachelor's degrees from the 




Fahad Arshad completed his Ph.D. from Purdue University in the Department of Electrical and 
Computer Engineering. His research interests focus on developing algorithms for software testing, 
error detection and failure diagnosis in distributed systems. He is particularly interested in 
data-driven analysis of computer systems. His work has appeared at top dependability conferences - 
DSN, ISSRE, ICAC, Middleware and SRDS, and he has been awarded grants to attend DSN, ICAC and 
ICNP. He has also been an active contributor to security research while working as a cybersecurity 





Security Engineer Justin Azoff is responsible for implementing security plans; assisting other NCSA 
groups in hardening and protecting their systems; and developing, administering and utilizing NCSA's 
state-of-the-art cybersecurity monitoring infrastructure in support of the Center's objective of 
providing a highly reliable and functional computing environment. Working with other Security 
Engineers, Azoff identifies and investigates cybersecurity incidents across NCSA networks and 
systems and responds to these events, interdicting malicious behavior, mitigating security 
vulnerabilities, remediating compromised systems and adjusting cybersecurity controls as 
appropriate to ensure similar malicious behavior is prevented in the future. Azoff has been a Bro 
user since 2009 and became a Bro developer as part of his security engineer role when he joined 





Saurabh Bagchi is a Professor in the School of Electrical and Computer Engineering and the 
Department of Computer Science (by courtesy) at Purdue University in West Lafayette, Indiana. He is 
an ACM Distinguished Scientist (2013), a Senior Member of IEEE (2007) and of ACM (2009), a 
Distinguished Speaker for ACM (2012), an IMPACT Faculty Fellow at Purdue (2013-14), and an 
Assistant Director of the CERIAS security center at Purdue. He is the Cybersecurity Lead for the NSF 
Center at Purdue called NEEScomm. His work on fault tolerance in distributed systems has been 
rewarded with recognition of best papers or runner-up awards at several conferences (Sensys 2011, 
Supercomputing 2012, 2009, SecureComm 2008, etc.) and through the Seed for Success award at 
Purdue University twice. He is proudest of the 11 PhD students who have graduated from his 




Steve Barnet has specialized in supporting scientific and academic computing for nearly 20 years. 
During that time, he has worked in multiple domains including storage, networking, high-throughput 
computing, and security. He handled his first incident in 1995, a compromised Solaris system 
providing several important infrastructure services. 
  
Steve is currently works for the IceCube project, a kilometer scale neutrino detector located at the 
geographic South Pole. He began collaborating with CTSC in 2013 to develop a Cybersecurity plan for 
the IceCube facility. 
 
* 
William Barnett oversees the life sciences research IT practice at Indiana University, both for basic 
research and for health care research including the IU School of Medicine, where he is an adjunct 
associate professor in Medical and Molecular Genetics.  He is the Co-Director of Translational 
Informatics at the Indiana Clinical and Translational Sciences Institute (CTSI).  Bill is the Director of 
the National Center for Genome Analysis Support (ncgas.org), which provides bioinformatics and 
computational support for genomics research.  He also oversees the Grid Operations Center for the 
Open Science Grid.  As an Associate Director of the Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research, Bill 
led the alignment of IU computing and data management systems with HIPAA. He is on the Steering 
Committee for the Association for American Medical Colleges (AAMC) Group on Information 
Resources (GIR) and faculty of the AAMC GIR Leadership Institute. 
* 
 
Jim Basney is a senior research scientist at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications 
(NCSA) at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Jim leads the CILogon project 
(www.cilogon.org), which enables federated authentication to cyberinfrastructure. Jim is also the 
security technical lead for XSEDE (www.xsede.org) Software Development and Integration (SD&I), 
and Jim is the identity management lead for the Software Assurance Marketplace (SWAMP). Jim 
maintains the MyProxy credential management software, an “exemplar of success in 
cyberinfrastructure software sustainability” according to the report from the NSF workshop on 
CyberInfrastructure Software Sustainability and Reusability ( http://hdl.handle.net/2022/6701). Jim is 
an active participant in The Americas Grid Policy Management Authority and the InCommon Technical 
Advisory Committee. Jim received his PhD in computer sciences from the University of 





Tony Baylis of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is the Laboratory's Director for the Office of 
Strategic Diversity and Inclusion Programs. In this position, he is the senior management advocate for 
diversity and inclusion for the Laboratory. The Office of Strategic Diversity and Inclusion Programs 
partners with senior management to develop strategies, initiatives, programs, and activities that 
promote the creation of a diverse and inclusive workforce and work environment. Tony serves as the 
Laboratory’s EEO, AA and Diversity compliance officer as well. In conjunction with these tasks, Tony is 
responsible for overseeing the laboratory’s interactions and successful execution in building, 
partnering and collaborating with governmental, educational, industrial, community interests and 
other stakeholders. LLNL has had a long history in working with Minority Serving Institutions, 
specifically relationships with American Indian Institutions, Hispanic Institutions and Historically 
Black College and Universities. He represents the Laboratory on the subjects of Diversity and 
Inclusion, STEM, Outreach Efforts, and Student Programs. 
  
Tony's career represents 26 years of administrative, project, program, technical and organizational 
management. He has worked in a scientific and technical environment for over 20 years and has 
worked as an consultant in industry as well. Tony has extensive experience networking with a broad 
range of academic, industry, government and non-profit organizations that has educated him and 
helped him in his career. He serves on a number of conference program committees and advisory 
boards that promote STEM and diversity in science and technical careers. He has been an NSF 
reviewer and PI/Co-Pi for the Broadening Participation in Computing Program. Tony is also an ACM 
and ACM SIGGRAPH member, and serves as the Treasurer for ACM SIGGRAPH. He is a graduate of the 




Gregory Bell is director of the Scientific Networking Division at Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory (Berkeley Lab), and director of the Energy Sciences Network (ESnet), the U.S. Department 
of Energy’s high-performance ​national network - one ​of the oldest and fastest computer networks in 
the world.  Previously, Bell served as Chief Technology Architect in Berkeley Lab’s IT Division, and 
prior to that he worked as a network engineer at Berkeley Lab.  His professional interests include 
advanced networking technologies, cyber-security models for open science, and data-intensive 
discovery.  Bell earned an AB from Harvard College (English), and a PhD from UC Berkeley, where he 
wrote an interdisciplinary dissertation on the cultural history of conspiracy belief.  Bell has also 
managed a non-profit agency serving political refugees, and served as an analyst for Amnesty 




Jasmine Bowers is a Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Cyber Defenders summer scholar 
and a second year M.S. candidate at North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University 
(NCAT). She holds two B.S. degrees in mathematics and computer science from Fort Valley State 
University (FVSU). She will graduate with an M.S. in computer science in May of 2015. This summer, 
she worked with two LLNL computer scientists on an iOS mobile application for simplifying and 
securing password-based authentication. This application will alleviate the burden and security risks 
associated with requiring a user to keep track of several complex passwords for various websites. 
 
Jasmine is also a research assistant in the NCAT Center for Advanced Studies in Identity Science 
(CASIS) group, directed by the NCAT computer science department chair. She is studying under the 
information assurance masters track and her research topic is author identification. At the 2013 
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Richard Tapia Diversity in Computing Conference, she presented “Android vs. iPhone: What’s Your 
Personality”, an undergraduate project that analyzed the correlation of users and phone operating 
system preferences. As an undergraduate, she worked with the Department of Defense as a civilian 
computer science cooperative education student. At FVSU, she served as treasurer of the ACM 
chapter, two-term president of the Eta chapter of Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, Inc., personal assistant 
to the Director of Leadership and Character Development, assistant to the Director of the 
Cooperative Developmental Energy Program, and teacher assistant. In addition, she served as a 
mathematics tutor at the local middle school and FVSU tutoring lab. 
 
In her spare time, she provides budget coaching and workshops. She recently presented financial 




Amy Butler has 15 years of IT experience, with ten in the creation and deployment of solutions 
protecting information assets and ensuring confidentiality, availability and integrity of a large 
enterprise environment. Ms. Butler is currently the AVP, Information Security and Compliance at The 
George Washington University. Previously, she held positions at The Coca Cola Company, Secore, Inc 
and Peking University. She is a Lecturer at GW's Graduate School of Business as well as its Graduate 
School of Computer Science. Ms. Butler holds an MBA from The George Washington University and 




Randal Butler serves as Deputy Director for CTSC and leads CTSC EOT activities. He is director of the 
NCSA’s Cybersecurity Directorate, Chief Security Officer for NCSA and the Security Officer for the NSF 
XSEDE project. Previously, he led security efforts for the National Computational Science Alliance 




Michael Corn is the Deputy CIO and CISO for Brandeis University. His areas of interest include privacy, 
identity management, and cloud services. He has been an active speaker and author on security and 
privacy and has participated in numerous Educause and Internet2 initiatives. He is a member of the 
Internet2 Netplus Product Advisory Board and until recently was also a member of the Box.com and 
Splunk Product Advisory Boards, as well as the Kuali Ready Product Board. 
 
Prior to joining Brandeis he was the CISO and Chief Privacy and Security Officer of the University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He is a graduate of the University of Colorado at Boulder and the 




Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld is a Professor and former Dean in the School of Labor and Employment 
Relations (LER) at the University of Illinois.  He is also a Senior Research Scientist with the National 
Center for Super Computing Applications (NCSA) and holds a courtesy appointment in Industrial and 
Enterprise Systems Engineering (IESE) at the University of Illinois.  Joel also serves as a visiting 
Professor in Work and Organizations at the University of Sydney, Australia. 
  
He is an award-winning author who has co-authored or co-edited eleven books, including Ford-UAW 
Pivots:  Transforming Work and Relationships to Deliver Results  (MIT Press, 2015 forthcoming), 
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Multinational Human Resource Management and the Law (Edward Elgar, 2013), Valuable Disconnects 
in Organizational Learning Systems (Oxford University Press, 2005), Lean Enterprise Value (Palgrave, 
2002), Knowledge-Driven Work (Oxford University Press, 1998), and Strategic Negotiations (Harvard 
Business School Press, 1994), and over eighty five articles on high performance work systems, 
transformation in labor-management relations, negotiations and conflict resolution, economic 
development, and engineering systems.  His current research centers on stakeholder alignment in 
complex systems – a foundation for 21st Century institutions.  Along with his co-inventors, he has a 
patent pending on a new visualization method designed to help see points of alignment and 
misalignment among stakeholders. 
  
Joel was the 2009 President of the Labor and Employment Relations Association (LERA).  Prior to 
coming to the University of Illinois, Joel served as a Senior Research Scientist and Executive Director 
of the Engineering Systems Learning Center, with a joint appointment in MIT’s Sloan School of 
Management and MIT’s Engineering Systems Division, as well as a Visiting Associate Professor at 
Babson College, and an Associate Professor at Michigan State University.  
  
Joel has extensive experience leading large-scale systems change initiatives with public and private 
stakeholders in Australia, Bermuda, Canada, Denmark, England, Iceland, Italy, Jamaica, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Panama, Poland, Spain, South Africa, and the United States.  He holds a Ph.D. in Industrial 




Kyle Chard is a Senior Research Project Professional at the Computation Institute, a joint venture 
between The University of Chicago and Argonne National Laboratory. He received a PhD degree in 
Computer Science from Victoria University of Wellington in 2011. His research focuses on applying 
cloud-based techniques to large scale research data management as part of the Globus project. His 
research interests also include distributed meta-scheduling, Grid and Cloud computing, economic 




Patrick Duda is a member of NCSA’s Cybersecurity directorate and is currently assigned to work on 
CTSC.  His responsibilities are to aid in the EOT efforts under the direction of Randy Butler.  Most of 
this work is aimed at developing training programs to disseminate security information to NSF 
funded CI projects.  Prior to joining NCSA Patrick worked with several software development 




Jeremy Epstein is lead program director for NSF’s Secure and Trustworthy Cyberspace (SaTC) 
program, NSF’s flagship cybersecurity research program.  He is on loan to NSF from SRI International, 
where his research areas including voting system security and software assurance.  Jeremy has spent 
25 years in the security field as a researcher, product developer, consultant, and program manager. 
He is associate editor in chief of IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine, and founder of the ACSA 
Scholarships for Women Studying Information Security (SWSIS) program.  He holds an MS from 






Barbara Fossum is the Deputy Director for the George E. Brown, Jr. Network for Earthquake 
Engineering Simulations (NEES), at Purdue University in Lafayette, Indiana.  In this capacity, Barbara 
directs the day-to-day operation and the development of cyberinfrastructure to support the $105 
million NSF distributed network of 14 earthquake engineering research centers. Barbara comes to 
Purdue from the NSF where she was a Program Manager from 2001 to 2004, for the Information 
Technology Research initiative within the Office of Cyberinfrastructure Research.  While currently 
devoting her time to Large Facility operations and management, she continues to be engaged in 




Ian Foster is Director of the Computation Institute, a joint institute of the University of Chicago and 
Argonne National Laboratory. He is also an Argonne Senior Scientist and Distinguished Fellow and 
the Arthur Holly Compton Distinguished Service Professor of Computer Science. 
  
Ian received a BSc (Hons I) degree from the University of Canterbury, New Zealand, and a PhD from 
Imperial College, United Kingdom, both in computer science. His research deals with distributed, 
parallel, and data-intensive computing technologies, and innovative applications of those 
technologies to scientific problems in such domains as climate change and biomedicine. Methods 
and software developed under his leadership underpin many large national and international 
cyberinfrastructures. 
  
Dr. Foster is a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the Association 
for Computing Machinery, and the British Computer Society. His awards include the Global 
Information Infrastructure (GII) Next Generation award, the British Computer Society's Lovelace 
Medal, R&D Magazine's Innovator of the Year, and an honorary doctorate from the University of 
Canterbury, New Zealand. He was a co-founder of Univa UD, Inc., a company established to deliver 








Bret Goodrich is the Software Manager for the Daniel K. Inouye Solar Telescope (DKIST). He is 
responsible for the High Level Software and Controls group, including the software development for 
the telescope, instrument cameras, data handling, observatory control, and architectural framework. 
In addition, he is responsible for the computing assets of the facility, including their specification, 
performance, security, and operational procedures. He has worked for over 30 years on telescope 
software and information technology at Kitt Peak National Observatory, Gemini Observatory, and the 
National Solar Observatory. He has participated in the design and development of numerous 




Christopher Gullo is a growing software developer contributing to LLNL’s research initiatives in cyber 
security situational awareness.  During the summer of 2014, Chris will expand his computer science 
skill set working on existing projects with the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Cyber 
Defenders Program that will be influential for years to come. 
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Chris enjoys spending time outdoors (hiking, biking, running, camping, sports), traveling, flying, 
following technological innovations, and more. Chris is a rising senior studying Computer Science at 
Rochester Institute of Technology where he has been honored to lead several class team projects. He 
participates in Air Force ROTC and plans to both graduate and commission in the United States Air 




David M. Halstead, Head of IT, CIO, National Radio Astronomy Observatory 
  
Highest Degree:  Ph.D., Computational Quantum Surface Chemistry, University of Liverpool, 1990 
  
Experience:  20+ years of experience with HPC systems and high speed storage/network solutions for 
both research and industry. Extensive knowledge of communications technologies and data 




1985-92 Doctoral and Post-doctoral research with 10+ peer reviewed journal articles exploring 
molecular interactions with metal surfaces. 
1992 Moved into HPC research at the Scalable Computing Laboratory of Ames Lab, DOE, 
implementing commodity parallel processing cluster solutions to benefit research in surface science, 
chemistry, physics and biology. ESNet representative for Lab. 
2002 Hired by Celera Genomics to drive the Strategic Platform Initiative; transitioning away from the 
~$20M leased computer systems used to sequence the human genome, to scalable HPC systems 
supporting proteomics and therapeutics research. 
2004 Moved to into corporate Applera to manage a team of ~12 Communications Services staff at ~6 
locations around the US coordinating special IT projects including multiple $100M+ Mergers & 
Acquisitions events. 
2008 hired as NRAO CIO in support of North American ALMA and NRAO-wide IT and Science 
Computing services. Now manage 26 staff under Business Office and Data Management & Software at 
3 main US locations, supporting 15 sites and interfacing with the Joint ALMA Observatory in Chile. 
  
Community Service 
Organizing Committee for Super Computing Conference series: SC94, SC99, SC05, SC10; SC13; SC14. 





Ardoth Hassler is Associate Vice President of University Information Services & Executive Director, 
Office of Assessment and Decision Support at Georgetown University. Her work focuses on policy, 
planning and research, including being the PI for an NSF CC-NIE award. She also supports institutional 
research, business intelligence, data warehousing and reporting. She was on loan to the National 
Science Foundation 2007-2011 where she served as Senior Information Technology Advisor in the 
Office of the Chief Information Officer in the NSF Office of Information and Resource Management, 
Division of Information Systems. Her activities included work related to cybersecurity best practices 
for large research facilities, working on technology policy for the Foundation and large research 
facilities, assisting NSF in joining the InCommon Federation and introducing concepts of 
single-sign-on logon to Research.gov, leading the SSN Be Gone​ project to remove SSNs from FastLane 
and other systems where there was no business need, working on NSF’s ​Got Green​ initiative, etc. 
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She has prior experience serving on the program committees of the NSF Cybersecurity Summit, 
EDUCAUSE Annual Conferences, etc..  She has a BS in Math (CS minor) from Oklahoma State 




Elisa Heymann is an Associate Professor in the Computer Architecture and Operating Systems 
Department at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. She co-directs the MIST software 
vulnerability assessment project in collaboration with her colleagues at the University of Wisconsin. 
 
She is also in charge of the Grid security group at the UAB, and participates in two major Grid 
European Projects:  EGI-InSPIRE and European Middleware Initiative (EMI). Heymann's research 
interests include security and resource management for Grid and Cloud environments. Her research 
is supported by the Spanish government, the European Commission, and NATO. 
 
Heymann received her M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in Computer Science from the Autonomous University 




Craig Jackson is Senior Policy Analyst at Indiana University's Center for Applied Cybersecurity 
Research (CACR), where his research interests include risk management, security, and identity 
management. He serves as the project manager for the Center for Trustworthy Scientific 
Cyberinfrastructure (CTSC); is part of the security team for the DHS-funded Software Assurance 
Marketplace (SWAMP); and is part of the DOE-funded XSIM (Extreme Scale Identity Management) 
project. He is a graduate of the IU Maurer School of Law (J.D.’10) and IU School of Education (M.S.’04). 
As a member of the Indiana bar, Mr. Jackson has litigated in federal and state court, primarily 
representing government and corporate clients in constitutional and tort claims. His research, design, 
and project management  background includes work at IU School of Education’s Center for Research 
on Learning and Technology and Washington University in St. Louis School of Medicine.  He is a 
member of Phi Beta Kappa, and was a Lien Honorary Scholar at Washington University in St. Louis.  He 





Dr. Clifford A. Jacobs worked for the National Science Foundation (NSF) for 30 years and for 25 years 
of that time provided oversight to the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) and its 
managing organization University Corporation for Atmospheric Research (UCAR). His oversight 
responsibilities cover a wide range of topics, such as acquisition of supercomputers, the 
development of world-class climate and weather models, the initiation and maturation of 
cyberinfrastructure necessary to delivery environmental data observations and products through the 
Unidata program, coordinated collaborative activities among Federal agencies, participation in the 
working group to develop NSF clarification of its data policy, the development of requirement for a 
data management plan, and chaired an internal group of cyberinfrastructure for NSF-sponsored large 
facilities. 
 
Dr. Jacobs has represented the geosciences in a variety of NSF studies and initiatives related to high 
performance computing and information technology, observing facilities, and best practices in the 
operation and management of facilities.  In addition, he assisted with the oversight, planning and 
execution of several complex agency activities, including the operation and management of major 
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facilities and the EarthCube endeavor.  Dr. Jacobs co-chairs an internal Directorate working group on 
Geoinformatics and data and serves a member of GEO facilities working group.  While serving in the 
Division of Advanced Cyberinfrastructure, he continue his efforts to engage the NSF staff and the 
community in a dialog about cybersecurity for NSF-sponsored large facilities.  
 




William T.C. Kramer is Director and Principle Investigator of the Blue Waters Project and is the 
Director of the UIUC/NCSA @Scale Program office. Bill is responsible for leading all aspects of the 
Blue Waters project, a National Science Foundation-funded project at NCSA.  Blue Waters the most 
powerful general purpose computational and data analytics available to open science, system 
available.  It is one of the most powerful resources for the nation’s researchers. It is the only public 
Top-5 systems in the world that chose not to list on the Top-500 list.  
 
Previously Bill was the general manager of the NERSC at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
(LBNL) was responsible for all aspects of operations and customer service for NASA's Numerical 
Aerodynamic Simulator (NAS) supercomputer center.  He also served as the CSO in those 
organizaions.  Blue Waters is the 20th supercomputer Kramer deployed and/or manages, deployed 
and managed large clusters of workstations, five extremely large data repositories, some of the 
world’s most intense networks.  He has also been involved with the design, creation and 
commissioning of six “best of class” HPC facilities. 
 
He holds a BS and MS in computer science from Purdue University, an ME in electrical engineering 
from the University of Delaware, a PhD in computer science at UC Berkeley. 
 
Kramer’s research interests include large-scale system performance evaluation, systems and 
resource management, job  scheduling, fault detection and resiliency, and cyber protection.  Kramer 
has taught classes and tutorials on large scale system management, computer architectures, 




Lee Liming is a Technical Communications Manager at the Computation Institute, a joint venture 
between The University of Chicago and Argonne National Laboratory. He has spent fourteen years 
working with scientists from many fields of study to build computing systems capable of supporting 
their ever-growing data and computing needs. Past collaborations have included civil engineers, 
space scientists and astronomers, climate scientists, high-energy physicists, energy scientists, 
cosmologists, social scientists and librarians, neuroscientists, cancer researchers, and, of course, 
computer scientists. Prior to working at the University of Chicago and Argonne, Lee was a Sr. Product 
Manager and Principal Engineer at ProQuest Information and Learning and an information technology 
manager at the University of Michigan. Lee received a B.S.E degree in Computer Engineering at the 




Paul Lordier a Senior at California State University Sacramento where he is pursuing a B.S. in 
Computer Science with a concentration in information assurance / cyber security, and a minor in 
Geographic Information Systems. His expected graduation date is Spring 2015. Paul is a recipient of 
the Cybercorps Scholarship for Service, a program sponsored by the National Science Foundation that 
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funds students pursing cyber security related programs with a goal of placing them in government 
cyber security jobs. Paul recently completed a summer internship in the Cyber Defenders program at 




As the Information Security Officer of the Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center, James A. Marsteller, Jr. 
(CISSP) is responsible for ensuring the availability and integrity of the PSC's high performance 
computing assets. Jim has over 12 years experience in the information security field and greater than 
17 years of professional experience in the field of technology. Prior to working at PSC, he was a 
program manager for the Carnegie Mellon Research Institute that provided information security 
consulting services for government agencies and Fortune 500 companies. Jim leads the XSEDE 
Incident Response team and is XSEDE’s security officer.  He is a Co-PI for the Center for Trustworthy 
Scientific Cyberinfrastructure (CTSC).  Jim chaired the program committee for the three most recent 




Celeste Matarrazzo is a data science expert with more than 27 years of service to the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory’s (LLNL) Computation Directorate. Celeste is presently the Associate 
Program Leader for Network Exploitation within the Global Security Principal Associate Directorate 
and currently the Principal Investigator for a large LLNL funded strategic initiative research project in 
cyber security situational awareness called Continuous Network Cartography following on from a 
successful research effort she led from November 2008 through September 2011. She is also the 
program manager for LLNL’s Cyber Defenders Summer Intern Program. Celeste was previously a 
division leader who provided oversight and technical leadership for computer scientists and 
technicians addressing global security issues. Celeste also was the project leader for the Advanced 
Simulation and Computing Program’s Scientific Data Management effort. Celeste has a B.S. in 
Mathematics and Computer Science from Adelphi University and pursued her graduate studies at the 
University of Wisconsin- Madison. 
* 
 
Michael McLennan is a Senior Research Scientist at Purdue University and Director of the HUBzero 
Platform for Scientific Collaboration. He created the Rappture toolkit as part of that platform. He has 
more than 20 years of software development experience in both academic and corporate 
environments, with an emphasis on computer-aided design tools and user interface design. 
  
Dr. McLennan received a Ph.D. in 1990 from Purdue University for his dissertation on dissipative 
quantum mechanical electron transport in semiconductor heterostructure devices. He became a Tcl 
enthusiast when he joined Bell Labs in 1992 to work on tools for semiconductor device and process 
simulation. He is co-author of “Effective Tcl/Tk Programming” (published by Addison-Wesley) and 
“Tcl/Tk Tools” (published by O’Reilly and Associates). He also developed [incr Tcl], an 
object-oriented extension of Tcl, which is now used by thousands of developers worldwide, on 




Pascal Meunier is the head of security and operations at HUBzero.  He has 15 years of experience 
working in computer security, starting at Purdue University CERIAS and continuing at HUBzero.  He 
has been an editor for MITRE's CVE since its early days and contributed to related efforts.  He created 





Kim Milford became Executive Director of REN-ISAC in April 2014. As Executive Director, Ms. Milford 
works with members, partners, sponsors and advisory committees to direct strategic objectives in 
support of member institutions, providing services and information that allows them to better 
defend local technical environments while overseeing administration and operations. She joined 
Indiana University in June 2007 and served in several different roles leading IT, information policy, 
and university privacy initiatives during her tenure. Most recently, Ms. Milford served as Chief 
Privacy Officer, coordinating privacy-related efforts, serving on IU's Assurance Council, chairing the 
Committee of Data Stewards, and directing the work of the University Information Policy Office, 
which includes IU's IT incident response team. Prior to joining Indiana University, Ms. Milford served 
as the Information Security Officer at the University of Rochester, where she successfully 
incorporated security plans and operations into strategic IT initiatives. In that role, she developed 
and led an information security program that included disaster recovery planning, identity 
management, incident response and user awareness. As Information Security Manager at 
UW-Madison's Department of Information Technology from 1998 - 2004, she assisted in the 
establishment of the university's information security department and co-led in the development of 
an annual security conference. Ms. Milford has provided presentations on information technology at 
various national conferences and seminars and participated in the authorship of articles and 
courseware. Ms. Milford has a B.S. in Accounting from Saint Louis University in St. Louis, Missouri and 




Barton Miller is Professor of Computer Sciences at the University of Wisconsin. He is Chief Scientist 
for the DHS Software Assurance Marketplace research facility.  He co-directs the MIST software 
vulnerability assessment project in collaboration with his colleagues at the Autonomous University 
of Barcelona. He also leads Paradyn Parallel Performance Tool project, which is investigating 
performance and instrumentation technologies for parallel and distributed applications and systems. 
His research interests include systems security, binary 
and malicious code analysis and instrumentation extreme scale systems, parallel and distributed 
program measurement and debugging, and mobile computing. Miller's research is supported by the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Energy, National Science Foundation, 
NATO, and various corporations. 
 
In 1988, Miller founded the field of Fuzz random software testing, which is the foundation of many 
security and software engineering disciplines. In 1992, Miller (working with his then-student, Prof. 
Jeffrey Hollingsworth, founded the field of dynamic binary code instrumentation and coined the 
term "dynamic instrumentation". Dynamic instrumentation forms the basis for his current efforts in 
malware analysis and instrumentation. 
 
Miller was the chair of the IDA Center for Computing Sciences Program Review Committee, a 
member of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Computing, Communications and Networking 
Division Review Committee, and has been on the U.S. Secret Service 
Electronic Crimes Task Force (Chicago Area), the Advisory Committee for Tuskegee University's High 
Performance Computing Program, and the Advisory Board for the International Summer Institute on 
Parallel Computer Architectures, Languages, and 




Miller received his Ph.D. degree in Computer Science from the University of California, Berkeley in 




Pascal Meunier is the head of security and operations at HUBzero.  He has 15 years of experience 
working in computer security, starting at Purdue University CERIAS and continuing at HUBzero.  He 
has been an editor for MITRE's CVE since its early days and contributed to related efforts.  He created 




Gaspar Modelo-Howard is a Senior Researcher at Narus, a big data analytics for cybersecurity 
company and wholly owned subsidiary of the Boeing Company. He is also the Director for the ARGUS 
Information Security and Networking Lab at the Technological University of Panama. Gaspar has 
worked for over 14 years as a cyber-security consultant and engineer and as a college professor. He 
has a PhD in Computer Engineering from Purdue University and a MSc in Information Security from 
Royal Holloway, University of London. His current research interests lie at the intersection between 
machine learning and system security, particularly in the areas of malware detection, signature 




William "Clay" Moody is a Computer Science Ph.D. Candidate at Clemson University, Clemson, SC. 
Clay is an active duty U.S. Army Major and will join the faculty of the Electrical Engineering and 
Computer Science Department at the United States Military Academy at West Point upon the 
completion of his doctoral studies. His research is focused on designing, modeling, and building 
applications that introduce the military concept of maneuver allowing parallel and distributed 
systems to be provisioned, optimized and secured. Clay is a founding member of the United States 
Cyber Command at Fort Meade, MD and a former Cyber Battle Captain in the Joint Operations Center. 





Anita Nikolich is Program Director for Cybersecurity in the Division of Advanced Cyberinfrastructure 
at the National Science Foundation (NSF). Prior to her work at the NSF she served as the Executive 
Director of Infrastructure at the University of Chicago. Past assignments include Director of Global 
Data Networking at Aon and Director of Security for Worldcom. She has explored how information 
technology and secure networking can best support the creation and sharing of scientific knowledge 
in virtual, mobile and physical contexts. She holds a Master of Science from The University of 




Amy Northcutt was appointed Chief Information Officer of the National Science Foundation in 
January 2012.  In this capacity, she is responsible for NSF's information technology investments, 
governance, policy, and planning.  Prior to this appointment, Ms. Northcutt served as Deputy General 
Counsel of the Foundation from 2001 - 2012.  Ms. Northcutt holds a J.D., magna cum laude, from 






Rodney Petersen is the interim Executive Director of the Research and Education Community 
Security Collaborative, previously known as SecuriCORE. It is a new joint project between EDUCAUSE, 
Internet2, and Indiana University to establish a service organization to help improve cybersecurity at 
colleges and universities. Recently, he was the Managing Director of the EDUCAUSE Washington 
Office and a Senior Government Relations Officer. He also previously directed the EDUCAUSE 
Cybersecurity Initiative and was the lead staff liaison for the Higher Education Information Security 
Council. Prior to joining EDUCAUSE, he served as the Director of IT Policy and Planning in the Office of 
the Vice President and Chief Information Officer at the University of Maryland. He previously held 
the position of Campus Compliance Officer in the Office of the President at the University of 
Maryland where he mediated disputes and handled grievances under the Human Relations Code, 
including claims of discrimination or harassment that increasingly involved misuse of the Internet. 
He also completed one year of service as an Instructor in the Academy for Community Service for 
AmeriCorps National Civilian Community Corps where he taught alternative dispute resolution and 
facilitated service learning projects. He began his professional career in higher education as the 
Resident Student Life Director at Michigan State University. He is the co-editor of a book in the 
EDUCAUSE Leadership Strategy Series entitled "Computer and Network Security in Higher Education". 
He is also a founding member of the Association of College and University Policy Administrators and 
the author of "A Primer on Policy Development for Institutions of Higher Education" and "A 
Framework for IT Policy Development". He writes and speaks regularly on topics related to higher 
education cyber law and policy. He received his law degree from Wake Forest University. He also 
received a certificate as an Advanced Graduate Specialist in Education Policy, Planning, and 




Irene M. Qualters is currently Division Director of Advanced Cyberinfrastructure (ACI) at the National 
Science Foundation (NSF).   ACI is responsible for programs with a total annual budget in FY2013 of 
over $200 million. These programs support the acquisition, development, and provisioning of 
state-of-the-art cyberinfrastructure resources, tools, and services essential to the conduct of 21st 
century science and engineering research and education.    ACI is also responsible for the NSF-wide 
vision, strategy, planning and coordination for research cyberinfrastructure.  She joined NSF as a 
Program Director in December 2009, participating in multidisciplinary, interagency and international 
activities as well as overseeing several major computational projects within the division’s portfolio, 
including the Blue Waters project at NCSA/UIUC and the Stampede project at TACC/UT at Austin. 
Irene has a Master’s degree in Computer Science.  Prior to beginning her NSF responsibilities, she 
had a distinguished 30-year career in industry, with executive leadership positions for research and 
development organizations within the technology sector.  During her twenty years at Cray Research, 
in increasingly larger leadership roles, she participated in the development of the first commercially 
successful vectorizing compiler, the first multiprocessor version of Unix and Cray’s landmark 
massively parallel computer, the T3E.  Subsequently, for six years, as Vice President, she led the 
Research Information Systems for Merck Research Labs (MRL).  She is expert in parallel computer 
system architectures and in a wide variety of software from scientific applications to compilers to file 







Warren Raquel has been the Head of Operational Security and Incident Response and the National 
Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign 
(UIUC) for the last year where he leads a Security Operations team that provides network security for 
NCSA and associated projects like Blue Waters and XSEDE. Prior to that he was a Security Analyst for 
the Office of Privacy and Information Assurance for UIUC where he did Incident Response and Digital 
Forensics. Warren has been a highly active member of the Higher Education security community for 




LTC David Raymond is an Armor Officer in the U.S. Army and is currently serving as Director of 
Research in the Army Cyber Center at West Point.  He holds Bachelor’s and Master’s Degrees in 
Computer Science from the United States Military Academy and Duke University, and a Ph.D. in 
Computer Engineering from Virginia Tech.  LTC Raymond has significant operational experience as an 
Armor officer, to include serving as a tank platoon leader during Operation Desert Storm and as a 
tank battalion executive officer during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  He is a CISSP, Certified Ethical 
Hacker (CEH) and holds Global Information Assurance (GIAC) Certifications in Incident Handling, 
Intrusion Detection, Unix/Linux Security Administration, and Penetration Testing.  LTC Raymond 
teaches senior-level computer networking and cyber security courses at West Point and conducts 




Matthew Rosenquist joined Intel Corp in 1996 and benefits from 20 years in the field of security. Mr. 
Rosenquist specializes in security strategy, measuring value, and developing cost effective 
capabilities which deliver the optimal level of security. Currently, a cybersecurity strategist for the 
Intel Security Group, he helped in the formation of this global organization which brings together 
security across hardware, firmware, software and services. Previously, he managed the security 
playbook for Intel’s PC strategy planning group, encompassing all security features landing in the PC. 
Mr. Rosenquist built and managed Intel’s first global 24x7 Security Operations Center, oversaw 
several internal platform security products and services, deployed the enterprise intrusion detection 
program, and was the first Incident Commander for Intel’s worldwide IT emergency response team. 
He has conducted hundreds of security investigations leading to arrests and successful prosecutions 
in defense of corporate assets. He ran security for Intel’s multi-billion dollar worldwide mergers and 
acquisitions activities and justified the security strategy protecting Intel’s global manufacturing 
capability. 
 
Mr. Rosenquist is active in the industry, speaks at conferences, consults with industry partners, and 
has published acclaimed white papers, blogs, videos and audio-casts on a wide range of information 
security topics. He is very passionate about security and information technology, his chosen career 
path, and strives to blend practical risk mitigation practices and information technology capabilities 
to achieve an optimal level of security. 
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security topics. He is very passionate about security and information technology, his chosen career 
path, and strives to blend practical risk mitigation practices and information technology capabilities 





Stephen Schwab is a Senior Computer Scientist with the University of Southern California's 
Information Sciences Institute, where his research draws broadly from the systems, networking, 
computer architecture, and information security communities. He is a long-time contributor to the 
DETER Cyber Security testbed project, focusing on modeling of experimental phenomena and 
testbed architecture. He currently leads the DARPA SAFERLab project, focused on assessing 
technology for anonymous and non-blockable Internet communication through the definition and 
testbed realization of forward-looking motivating scenarios. He also leads the DARPA-sponsored 
Quasar Vetting project, investigating how to detect tampered (malicious) firmware pre-installed on 
devices within the commercial supply chain. In the larger community, Schwab has held from 2008 to 
the present time the role of Security Architect for NSF’s Global Environment for Network Innovations 
(GENI) initiative, aimed at deploying national-scale research infrastructure for the networking and 




Dr. Phyllis Schneck serves as the Deputy Under Secretary for Cybersecurity for the National 
Protection and Programs Directorate within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  Dr. 
Schneck is the chief cybersecurity official for DHS and supports its mission of strengthening the 
security and resilience of the nation’s critical infrastructure. 
 
Dr. Schneck came to DHS from McAfee, Inc., where she was Chief Technology Officer for Global Public 
Sector. Dr. Schneck served eight years as chairman of the National Board of Directors of the FBI’s 
InfraGard program and founding president of InfraGard Atlanta. 
 
Before joining McAfee, Dr. Schneck was Vice President of Research Integration for Secure 
Computing. She also worked as the Vice President of Enterprise Services for eCommSecurity; served 
as Vice President of Corporate Strategy for SecureWorks, Inc.; and, was Founder and Chief Executive 
Officer of Avalon Communications. 
 




Mark Servilla is Lead Scientist, Network Information System at LTER Network Office (LNO). At LNO, 
Mr. Servilla’s primary responsibility is the implementation of the LTER Network Information 
System—a system of standards and applications that support the interoperability of distributed LTER 
research sites, thus enabling synthetic science at the Network level and beyond. To achieve a 
successful Network Information System, he will rely on his skills as a computer scientist to use the 
latest computing technologies for maximum effectiveness within the NIS, while utilizing his 
experience as an earth scientist to better serve the needs and understand the requirements of LTER, 
associated scientists, and the field of Ecology in general. Prior to his current position at LNO, Mark's 
most recent role in the private sector at Photon Research Associates (PRA), Inc. was as architect of a 
web-based application (GeoServer TM) that provided the discovery, management, and exploitation 
of geospatial data, including Earth observation imagery and GIS vector objects. Mark holds graduate 
degrees in Earth and Planetary Sciences (Volcanology) and Computer Science, both from the 




Anurag Shankar oversees HIPAA and other regulatory compliance activities at the University 
Information Technology Services (UITS) at Indiana University (IU).  He spearheaded the technical 
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effort that led to the HIPAA alignment of UITS systems in 2008.  He is a computational astrophysicist 
by training and has a Ph.D. in Astronomy from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.  After 
postdoctoral work in Astronomy at the University of Arizona and IU, he switched professions to IT in 
1995. He started his IT career as a senior Unix systems programmer at Brown University and then 
moved back to IU in 1997.  He has spent the past seventeen years with the Research Technologies 
division of UITS at IU, playing a variety of roles that include managing Unix support, massive data 
storage, and the national Teragrid project, and supporting the research mission of the IU School of 
Medicine. He has been responsible for building several of IU's large data storage environments,  for 
establishing research computing services for IU's Indiana Genomics Initiative and other life sciences 
efforts, and for co-building an information infrastructure and technology solutions for the Indiana 




Nigel Sharp is the Program Director for the Large Synoptic Survey Telescope project, in the Division of 
Astronomical Sciences (AST) in the Directorate for Mathematical and Physical Sciences (MPS) of the 
National Science Foundation (NSF). He has just worked LSST through the process of federal funding 
for major projects. He has some additional programmatic responsibilities, too minor to mention. 
After three degrees in physics, mathematics, and astrophysics at the University of Cambridge (the 
real one), Nigel moved to Texas and had a varied career in astronomy theory and observation, 
including instrumentation and telescope management. His service work has included supercomputer 
access and numerical methods consulting, and systems management, networking and security at an 
NSF FFRDC. After all that, it made sense to join NSF and continue to work on service to the 
community from the funding end of things.  He has been involved in NSF’s cyberinfrastructure 
initiatives, was part of the working group for interdisciplinary research, and helped to define and to 








Robin Sommer is a Senior Researcher at the International Computer Science Institute, Berkeley, and 
he is also a member of the cyber-security team at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.  Robin 
Sommer's research focuses on network security and privacy, with a particular emphasis on 
high-performance network monitoring in operational settings. He is leading the development of the 
open-source Bro network security monitor, and he is a co-founder of Broala, a recent start-up 




Susan Sons serves as a Senior Systems Analyst at Indiana University's Center for Applied 
Cybersecurity Research.  Susan comes to CACR and CTSC from a background in abuse management 
and web application development. She's a founding member of the Internet Civil Engineering 
Institute (ICEI), and is a co-author of The Definitive Guide to Drupal 7.  Her interests include 
penetration testing, vulnerability management, security-conscious development practices, historical 





Steven Tuecke is Deputy Director of the Computation Institute (CI) at The University of Chicago and 
Argonne National Laboratory, and co-leads the Globus project (www.globus.org) with Dr. Ian Foster. 
His focus is on the development of sustainable, cloud-based, software-as-a-service data 
management solutions to accelerate research. Prior to CI, Steven was co-founder, CEO and CTO of 
Univa Corporation from 2004-2008, providing open source and proprietary software for the 
high-performance computing and cloud computing markets.  Before that, he spent 14 years at 
Argonne as research staff. Tuecke graduated summa cum laude with a B.A in mathematics and 




Heidi L. Wachs is a Research Director on the Gartner for Technical Professionals Identity & Privacy 
Strategies Team where she publishes, presents, and advises clients on best practices for data privacy, 
information classification, and identity and access governance. 
  
Prior to joining Gartner, Heidi was the Chief Privacy Officer & Director of IT Policy for Georgetown 
University. She combined her professional background in technology policy and public relations to 
develop and implement sound policy to preserve the privacy and integrity of those who use 
Georgetown University information systems and their data.  Before Georgetown, Heidi worked in 
government relations and advocacy focusing on intellectual property and technology policy issues. 
Earlier in her career she worked in public relations representing technology-focused clients. 
  
Heidi graduated cum laude with a BA in Journalism from Lehigh University and earned her JD with a 
concentration in Intellectual Property from the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.  She is a Certified 
Information Privacy Professional, and a member of the District of Columbia Bar and the United States 




Von Welch is the director of Indiana University’s Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research (CACR) 
and PI for the Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure, a project dedicated to helping 
NSF science projects with their cybersecurity needs. His expertise lies in applied research and 
practice of cybersecurity for distributed systems. Other roles include serving as CSO of the Software 
Assurance Market Place, a DHS-funded facility to foster software assurance and software assurance 
research, PI on a Department of Energy funded grant focused on identity management for 
extreme-scale scientific collaboration, and serving the Open Science Grid as an identity management 
expert. Previously he has worked with a range of high-visibility projects to provide cybersecurity to 
the broader scientific and engineering community, including TeraGrid, Open Science Grid, Ocean 
Observatory Infrastructure, and GENI. His work in software and standards includes authoring two IETF 




John Wroclawski is director of the University of Southern California's Information Sciences Institute’s 
Internet and Networked Systems division, with responsibility for the strategic direction of this 
40-member research organization. The division holds a historic and continuing role in the 
development of the Internet, and today maintains active programs of research in areas such as 
Internet protocols and architecture, network and distributed system security, sensing and sensor 
nets, network measurement and characterization, cyberphysical systems, and the Smart Grid. 
Wroclawski’s immediate technical interests include the architecture, technology and protocols of 
large, decentralized communication systems such as the Internet, architectural aspects of 
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cyberphysical systems, and the core principles of self-organizing and self-structuring architectures. 
His contributions to the development of large-scale cyberinfrastructure for the networking and 
cybersecurity communities include an ongoing role as chief scientist of the DHS-supported DETER 










































Call for White Papers, Training, and Student 
Applications 
2014 NSF Cybersecurity Summit for Large Facilities and 
Cyberinfrastructure 
August 26 - 28 ✶ Westin Arlington Gateway ✶ Arlington, VA 
http://trustedci.org/2014summit/ 
Theme:  Large Facility Cybersecurity Challenges and Responses 
It is our great pleasure to announce that the 2014 Cybersecurity Summit will take 
place Tuesday, August 26th through Thursday, August 28th, at the Westin Arlington 
Gateway near National Science Foundation Headquarters in Arlington, VA. On 
August 26th, the Summit will offer a full day of information security training. The 
second and third days will follow a workshop format designed to identify both the 
key cybersecurity challenges facing Large Facilities and the most effective 
responses to those challenges. 
Spanning six years from 2004-2009 and reinstated in 2013, the annual NSF 
Cybersecurity Summit serves as a valuable part of the process of securing the NSF 
scientific cyberinfrastructure by providing the community a forum for education, 
sharing experiences, building relationships, and establishing best practices. 
The NSF CI ecosystem presents an aggregate of complex, unique cybersecurity 
needs (e.g., scientific data and instruments, unique computational and storage 
resources, complex collaborations) as compared to other organizations and 
sectors. This community has a unique opportunity to develop information security 
practices tailored to these needs, as well as break new ground on efficient, effective 
ways to protect information assets while supporting science. The Summit will bring 
together leaders in NSF CI and cybersecurity to continue the processes initiated in 
2013: Building a trusting, collaborative community, and seriously addressing that 
community’s core cybersecurity challenges. 
Call for White Papers 
Please submit brief white papers focused on NSF Large Facilities’ unmet 
cybersecurity challenges, lessons learned, and/or significant successes.  White 
papers (and presentations) may be in the form of position papers and/or narratives 
and may be one to five pages in length. 
Criteria: All submitted white papers will be included in the 2014 summit report. The 
Program Committee will select the most relevant, reasoned, and broadly interesting 
for presentation during the Summit Plenary Session (Aug 27-28). A limited amount 
of funding is available to assist with travel for accepted submissions. 
Extended submission deadline:  July 12, 2014 
Submit to: Craig Jackson, scjackso@indiana.edu 
Word limit:  400 to 2000 words (~1-5 single spaced pages) 
Notification of acceptance:  July 16, 2014 
Call for Information Security Training 
Please submit brief abstracts from individuals or teams willing to present half and 
full-day training on August 26. Training may be targeted at technical and/or 
management audiences.  Areas of interest include, but are not limited to, 
cybersecurity planning and programs, risk assessment and management, 
regulatory compliance, identity and access management, networks security and 
monitoring, secure coding and software assurance, physical security in the context 
of information security, and information security of scientific and emerging 
technologies. The Program Committee will select the most community-relevant and 
broadly interesting training sessions for presentation during the first day of the 
summit (Aug 26). 
Extended submission deadline:  July 12, 2014 
Submit to: Craig Jackson, scjackso@indiana.edu 
Word Limit:  600 words 
Notification of Acceptance:  July 16, 2014 
Call for Student Applications 
Please submit a one page reference or cover letter and a student resume detailing 
how the student would benefit from attending the Summit. Recognizing that 
inclusivity and diverse participation is both a socially relevant outcome for NSF and 
a particular challenge in the cybersecurity community in general, the Program 
Committee will consider diversity when selecting successful applications. 
Cover letters should address the student’s interest in science and/or information 
security. Up to five successful student applicants will receive invitations to attend 
the Summit, and the opportunity for reimbursement of travel expenses. All 
submissions will be reviewed by the Program Committee and organizers. 
Extended submission deadline:  July 12, 2014 
Submit to: Craig Jackson, scjackso@indiana.edu 
Word limit for cover letters: 600 words 
Notification of Acceptance:  July 16, 2014 
Program Committee and Organizers 
Amy Apon, Chair of the Computer Science Division of the Clemson University School 
of Computing and former Director of the Arkansas High Performance Computing 
Center. 
Anthony (Tony) Baylis, Director, Office of Strategic Diversity Programs at Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory. 
Michael Corn, Deputy CIO and CISO for Brandeis University. 
Barb Fossum, NEES deputy center director and former managing director of Purdue 
University’s Cyber Center and Computer Research Institute. 
Kelly Gaither, Director of Visualization, Texas Advanced Computing Center. 
Ardoth Hassler, Associate Vice President of University Information Services & 
Executive Director, Office of Assessment and Decision Support at Georgetown 
University and former Senior Information Technology Advisor in the Office of the 
CIO in the NSF Office of Information and Resource Management, Division of 
Information Systems. 
Craig Jackson (Organizer), Senior Policy Analyst, Center for Applied Cybersecurity 
Research, Indiana University, and Project Manager, Center for Trustworthy Scientific 
Cyberinfrastructure (CTSC) 
James Marsteller (Organizer and Program Committee Chair), Information Security 
Officer, Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center, and Co-PI, Center for Trustworthy 
Scientific Cyberinfrastructure (CTSC). 
William “Clay” Moody, Computer Science PhD candidate and an active duty US Army 
Major stationed as an Army Fellow at Clemson University. Following his PhD 
studies, he has an appointment to the faculty of the Department of Electrical 
Engineering and Computer Science at West Point, the United States Military 
Academy. 
Rodney Petersen, interim Executive Director of the Research and Education 
Community Security Collaborative (previously known as SecuriCORE) and former 
Managing Director of the EDUCAUSE Washington Office and a Senior Government 
Relations Officer. 
Mark Servilla, Lead Scientist, Network Information System at LTER Network Office 
(LNO). 
Von Welch, (Organizer), Deputy Director, Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research, 




































































































































1. What is NEES and what role does Cybersecurity Play in it? 
Earthquakes and tsunamis can be devastating not only to the infrastructure of a society, but also to 
families, the community, and people’s sense of security. To reduce the impact of these events, 
fundamentally to save lives, the George E. Brown, Jr. Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation 
(NEES) originated as a national, multi-user, research infrastructure to enable research and innovation in 
earthquake and tsunami loss reduction, create an educated workforce in hazard mitigation, and conduct 
broader outreach and lifelong learning activities [1]. 
In the ten years since officially opening its doors in 2004 to outside users, NEES has created a vibrant 
collaboratory consisting of unique laboratories and cyberinfrastructure with its collaboration platform, 
NEEShub, representing hundreds of millions of dollars of investment. The NEES collaboratory has 
served tens of thousands of users from over 210 different nations. In 2009, Purdue University took over 
from NEES Inc. as the manager of a network of 14 advanced laboratories [2] connected by a 
cyberinfrastructure. The NEES Community and Communications Center (NEEScomm) was established 
in West Lafayette, IN. The anticipated end of that project is May 2015, with the expectation of a future 
solicitation.  
Participating universities in NEES include: Cornell University; Lehigh University; Oregon State 
University; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; University at Buffalo, State University of New York; 
University of California, Berkeley; University of California, Davis; University of California, Los 
Angeles; University of California, San Diego; University of California, Santa Barbara; University of 
Illinois, Urbana-Champaign; University of Minnesota; University of Nevada, Reno; and the University of 
Texas, Austin. Each of these university-based laboratories enabled researchers to explore a different 
aspect of the complex way that soils and structures behave in response to earthquakes and tsunamis. The 
laboratories were available not just to researchers at the universities where they are located, but to 
investigators throughout the United States who were awarded grants through NSF’s annual NEES 
Research (NEESR) Program and other NSF programs. 
In July 2010, NEEScomm released the first version of the NEEShub, the collaboration platform of 
NEES researchers [3] and based on HUBzero, a content management system built to support scientific 
activities [6]. Linking the NEES experimental facilities to each other, to NEEScomm, and to off-site 
users, this unique system of information technology resources has enabled researchers participating on-
site or remotely to collect, view, process, and store data from NEES experiments at the NEEScurated 
central repository (Project Warehouse), to conduct numerical simulation studies, and to perform hybrid 
(combined experimental and numerical) testing involving one or more NEES equipment sites. 
Role of cybersecurity in NEES 




NEES has developed a comprehensive cybersecurity approach that includes best practice cybersecurity 
policies and mechanisms at NEEScomm and an annual security audit at each of the NEES sites [4]. The 
goal of our cybersecurity plan is to enable earthquake engineering and science to proceed unimpeded by 
security outages affecting the NEEShub, either the computational nodes or the data warehouse. This goal 
calls for careful tango between the needs of doing science quickly and keeping the IT assets secure from 
attacks. The cast of characters, i.e., the “stakeholders”, who are most directly influenced by the 
cybersecurity practices are the earthquake engineers at the sites, the IT managers at the sites (who are 
responsible for maintaining the local machines and software on them), and the software development 
team at NEEScomm. The attack surface is large because we run an “open cyberinfrastructure”, i.e., 
anyone with a valid email address can get access to (some) assets from NEEShub. Also, since the 
machines at the individual sites are used to access NEEShub, we are also tasked with auditing the security 
of these machines. The level of staffing is difficult to pinpoint unambiguously because the cybersecurity 
staff, who are within the broader NEEScomm IT organization, are liberally and routinely helped by 
people in the broader IT organization. The core cybersecurity staff is composed of a faculty member 
(Bagchi), a cybersecurity staff engineer (Howard), and a half-time graduate student (Arshad). 
Additionally, approximately 2 people from the broader group routinely perform cybersecurity activities 
such as installation of security patches and unlocking accounts.  
The result of a well-documented planning process and then the implementation and deployment has 
been no reportable cybersecurity incident in the 5 years of existence. The cybersecurity activities have 
resulted in no major complaint from any of the stakeholders. Next, we describe the insights we have 
obtained by running this kind of a cyberinfrastructure for the past 5 years.  
2. Insights in running cybersecurity operations in a multi-institutional university 
setting 
There are several unique challenges that arose in the cybersecurity operations in our environment. The 
three top ones among them are: 
1. Different universities have different cybersecurity policies and our policies had to “play nice” with 
them, including those at Purdue. For example, the password strength and password change policies 
differed widely.  
Solution: We sometimes enforced stronger rules and had them apply to those machines that are part of 
the NEES network. Thus, an “inner shell” of machines and other equipment (routers, PLC controllers, 
etc.) were created within the university IT resources and different policies applied on them, as they 
share the network with non-NEES equipment. 




2. We were responsible for doing security audits of equipment which we did not own or have root 
access on. This applied to the IT equipment at the sites (for which we did an annual security scan, 
plus periodic low intensity scans) as well as some equipment at Purdue (which were administered by 
the HUBzero team).  
Solution: We negotiated elevated privileges for the purpose of the security scanning. Thus, we 
installed the tools for scanning to have the higher privileges but not give the root account to us. This 
highlighted the human element of doing cybersecurity in an environment such as ours. We had to tread 
carefully on the sensitivities of IT professionals at many organizations and believe we were successful 
in this and currently have the feeling of pulling together as part of a big team, rather than the very 
conceivable alternative – an adversarial relationship.   
3. How to test for external threats as well as internal threats? The notion of perimeter security is 
ingrained in security products and the cybersecurity controls in place at NEEScomm as well as at the 
sites are no exception. The question was should we test for threats that can be launched externally 
(i.e., from outside the campus network) as well as internally.  
Solution: We decided in favor of doing the testing both ways primarily because with large campuses 
and some of the users likely to fall prey to security attacks (such as, phishing) it is likely that there will 
be insider threats. We therefore set up VPN connections for many of the sites’ IT infrastructure and 
launched attacks through there, as well as launch attacks from pure external IP addresses. 
Philosophically, the cybersecurity controls at NEEScomm (at Purdue) had to be more stringent simply 
because we are in a position providing service to all the sites and we are developing software for wide 
use. For example, we employed static scanning of software as well as dynamic discovery of 
vulnerabilities for NEEScomm IT infrastructure.  
3. Cybersecurity Research and Practice: Where do the Twains Meet? 
All of us, the co-authors, are cybersecurity researchers and this project has made us keenly aware of 
the different worlds of research and applications of the research. Here we give a whirlwind tour of where 
the former aids the latter and where the twains are still far apart. In reading this, you should be cognizant 
of the fact that academic security research sometime neglects the issues of building robust tools, the user 
interface for the tool, and applicability of the research prototype to a variety of operational environments. 
It neglects these issues in favor of intellectual novelty in the work.  
We made wide use of some tools that came out of academic research and are still the subject of 
vigorous academic research, an appreciable amount of which feeds back into the tools. Such tools are Bro 
(intrusion detection), OpenVAS/Nessus (general scanner for vulnerability assessment of 
systems/protocols), nmap (hosts and services discovery tool), nikto (scanner for vulnerability assessment 




of web servers), Splunk (Log visualization and analysis tool for both security and operations), Tripwire 
(host-based intrusion detection system), Coverity (static code analysis tool used to test Java software at 
NEES), Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP) tool (a penetration testing tool for testing PHP code at NEES), fail2ban 
(a reactive service that bans when an automated bot or a hacker tries to login more than X number of 
times), iptables (to manage firewall rules on hosts). Some of these tools understandably needed significant 
effort in customization to our specific environment.  
As academic researchers, we shone the mirror on ourselves and realized that academic security 
research could be benefited by exposure to specific operational challenges that an environment like NEES 
provided. One is security configuration management, which deals with the fact that security 
administration needs more help through tools. This is keeping in line with the increasing complexity of 
today’s computer systems, which are more distributed and host an increasing number of applications. A 
problem faced here, and a possible reason why this area has seen relatively little work is the unavailability 
of security datasets from real-world systems. A second aspect is the need to concentrate on the false 
positives problem for signature-based detection systems. The primary reason that administrators improve 
a given signature over time, manually, is to reduce the false-positive rate. Research efforts should aim to 
do this more automatically even if it requires sacrificing accuracy considerably. Administrators do not 
want to waste time or even take actions on false alarms. Administrators get desensitized after using a tool 
with high number of false alarms, a phenomenon also well known in a hospital setting [5], and this may 
lead to missing the true alarms. 
4. Conclusion 
In this article we have described the cybersecurity activities in NEES, an NSF-funded center for 
earthquake engineering research, with research being done by scientists at 14 sites throughout the country. 
We have highlighted some of the unique challenges that arise in such a multi-institution setting and our 
pragmatic efforts at solving them. We concluded the article by considering the interplay between 
academic security research and practical security controls in a production environment such as ours.  
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The abuse and misuse of shared system resources is not new, but it is often surprising to                                 
communities building science gateways, who naively expect their user base to be ethical and                           
well­behaved. When abuse occurs, it is difficult to combat, because it takes different forms and                             
evolves as gateways add new, engaging features. The more feature­rich the facility, the more                           
there can be ways to abuse it. Our experience comes from creating and hosting more than 40                                 
science gateways based on the HUBzero platform. These gateways span a variety of                         
disciplines, from nanotechnology to climate modeling to healthcare to engineering education, to                       
name a few. These sites have substantial user communities with tens of thousands, or even                             
hundreds of thousands, of users every year. Because of that, HUBzero has been the target of                               
old email SPAM, but also HTTP proxy abuse, link SPAM, uploaded advertisements of many                           
formats and types, uploaded rootkits, viruses (e.g., hidden in uploaded images), and other                         
(mostly unsuccessful) exploits. 
 
The cost of defending against abuse is a constant drain on human and computing resources.                             
Monitoring and patrolling manually has issues of scale, whereas automatic methods may reduce                         
the usability of the features or produce many false positives. The trade­off between usability,                           
security, and management costs is especially thorny for the hubs we support, because we want                             
to have a low barrier to entry to the public and offer rich functionality on a low budget. The                                     





This Apache module is a web application firewall, mused to block recognizable attacks.                         
Recognition relies on many complex, multi line regular expressions. It works for standard web                           
sites, but is mismatched for complex applications like HUBzero. HUBzero has custom                       
communications (for VNC) riding on top of HTTP, as well as a RESTful Application                           
Programming Interface (API), and many components. We were unable to modify the regular                         
expressions used by modsecurity while having assurance that they were still effective at                         
blocking all the attacks they should. In most cases all, we could do, given the time we had, was                                     




Some abusers kept creating fake accounts for the purpose of abusing science gateways. We                           
attempted to block the IP addresses and networks they used, but apparently they had access to                               
many proxies or other hosts, and the technique was ineffective due to the human cost. This                               
remained true even when the capability was granted to many different administrators and other                           





To decrease the amount of submitted and uploaded SPAM, we used an Apache module that                             
queries the Spamhaus service. This service maintains blacklists of IP addresses used to send                           
SPAM, as well as IPs indicating infected computers. The Apache module allowed people to                           
view the site, but not submit material. This was modestly effective, and in addition made many                               
users realize that their computer was infected. However, we found that organizations forcing                         
their internal users through web proxies would often get their proxies blacklisted. This included                           




We downloaded and deployed the Dshield blacklist of IP addresses, which is updated regularly                           
based on observed attacks. The list is small and updates are easily automated. Surprisingly,                           




We have found that temporarily blocking IP addresses based on undesirable activity was very                           




We have found that using ClamAV to scan all uploads was very effective. Nevertheless, we                             












• Blocking single IP addresses will be futile with IPv6, due to the very large number of IP                                   
addresses available, which makes each IP address effectively disposable. We need software                       
to be able to correlate and aggregate undesirable behavior from ranges of IP addresses, and                             
block appropriately sized networks. 
 
• Use federated lists of bad actors, identified from various factors such as email addresses, IP                                 
addresses, and any other useful information, to limit the capabilities of abusers. 
 
• Organizations that cared or monitored whether any of their IP addresses were listed by                               
Spamhaus as used for SPAM or as showing signs of malicious activity. 
 
Network security is an ongoing battle between hosting providers and attackers, with ordinary                         
users caught on the battlefield between them. Ideally, the ordinary users could go about their                             
business unaware of the war raging around them. But occasionally, their experience is                         
interrupted by SPAM, by forced password resets, and by capabilities taken away when                         
attackers abuse them. Still, the ongoing war forces us to constantly improve our support,                           
benefitting all users in the long run. 
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 This unclassified talk will analyze cyber security threats at the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels and focus on steps that units should take to minimize the risk of successful 
attacks on their organizations.  While it is helpful to understand the motivations and methods of 
external actors, it is perhaps more useful to be aware of the vulnerabilities introduced by non-
malicious insiders.  A combination of inexperienced administrators and untrained or unaware 
users can make a network extremely vulnerable to even unsophisticated external threat actors. 
 At the strategic level, the three primary threats are organized cyber crime syndicates, 
nation-state actors, and hactivists [1] [2].  Organized cyber criminals find ways to monetize their 
online activities by stealing user account credentials or amassing botnets to rent to spammers.  
Nation-state actors, some referred to as Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), generally have two 
goals.  First, to gain access to intellectual property to reduce their own research and 
development costs, and second, to conduct reconnaissance and identify vulnerabilities for future 
exploitation.  Hacktivist groups such as Anonymous are often loosely organized and are 
motivated to make a political statement. Their techniques range from coordinated DDoS attacks 
to more high-tech hacking and theft of user information to embarrass the target. 
 The threat landscape is different at the operational and tactical levels where much of it is 
internal, and mostly non-malicious.  Despite the significant press coverage of some recent high-
profile malicious insiders, they are rare compared to non-malicious ones.  A 2013 study by 
Symantec concluded that 64% of system breaches world-wide were caused by system glitches 
or human factors.  Only 35% of breaches are caused by malicious or criminal attack [3]. 
 Personnel shortages and insufficient training often leave units without well-trained mid-
grade non-commissioned officers to supervise network device installation and security 
configuration.  Combine this with long and stressful work hours common in deployed 
environments and the likelihood of error increases.  Basic techniques for minimizing attack 
surface, such as patching and updating, changing default login credentials, and limiting access 
to critical data, are often not carefully followed.  Additionally, these environments can make 
even careful users vulnerable to social engineering.  Furthermore, the close physical proximity 
of secure and non-secure systems, particularly in deployed environments, makes accidental 
spillage of classified data commonplace.  Extreme care must be taken to put compensating 
controls in place to reduce the likelihood of compromised classified networks and data. 
 A third type of insider threat is the circumventer, who knowingly but non-maliciously 
bypasses security controls in the name of mission accomplishment.  An example is a deployed 
operator who can't get sufficient bandwidth for his unit from trusted NIPR connections so he 
routes some of the unit's NIPR computers through an untrusted host-nation ISP.  
 When lack of operator skill results in reduced confidence in preventive and detective 
controls, compensating controls, such as increased monitoring of vulnerable systems, must be 
put in place.  This talk will delve into the above threats and, time permitting, will provide 
actionable strategies that organizations should take to mitigate risk in their networks. 
____________________________ 
[1] Verizon RISK Team. (2013) 2013 Data Breach Investigations Report. Technical Report. [Online]. http://www.verizonenterprise.com 
[2] Mandiant, Inc. (2013) Mandiant APT1, Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units. Technical Report. [Online]. 
http://intelreport.mandiant.com 
[3] Ponemon Institute. (2013, May) 2013 Cost of Data Breach Study: Global Analysis. White Paper. [Online]. http://www4.symantec.com 
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Outline of Talk: 
 
I. High-level threat overview. http://www.verizonenterprise.com 
 1. Cyber criminals  
  - Organized cyber crime 
  - Other cyber criminals 
 2. Nation-state actors and the APT 
  - Characteristics of APT 
  - Suspected APT actors 
   - China (Mandiant Report: http://intelreport.mandiant.com) 
   - Russia www.afpc.org/files/november2012.pdf 
   - Iran (as a potential emerging APT threat) 
 3. Hacktivism. Actors and strategies 
 4. Cyber Terrorism – (Not quite on par with the above 3, but worth mention.) 
  http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/defining-cyberterrorism-capturing-a-broad-range-of-activities-in-cyberspace 
 
II. Attacker techniques (briefly) 
 1. Social Engineering 
  - Phishing/spear-phishing 
  - Watering holes 
 2. External attack techniques 
  - Network scanning/host enumeration/port enumeration 
  - Exploiting vulnerabilities 
  - Web application hacking 
 
III. Insider threats 
 1. Malicious insiders 
  - Definition, examples, and difficulty in identifying 
 2. Accidental insiders 
  - Definition and examples 
 3. “Circumventors” 
  - Definition and examples 
 
IV. Overview of effective defense strategies (time permitting) 
 1. Critical Security Controls (SANS 20 Critical Controls) http://www.sans.org/critical-security-controls/ 
  - Introduction to controls with pointers to more information 
 2. Australian Top 4 Mitigation Strategies http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/top35mitigationstrategies.htm 
 3. Risk management and prioritization 
  - Risk analysis  
  - Return on investment 
 
V. Concluding remarks 
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Managing	  Security	  Policies	  for	  
Federated	  Cyberinfrastructure	  	  White	  Paper	  submitted	  to	  the	  2014	  NSF	  Cybersecurity	  Summit	  for	  Large	  Facilities	  and	  Cyberinfrastructure	  	  Stephen	  Schwab	  and	  John	  Wroclawski	  USC	  Information	  Sciences	  Institute	  {schwab,	  jtw}@isi.edu	  July	  13,	  2014	  	  Significant	  current	  and	  future	  investment	  is	  represented	  by	  the	  collection	  of	  large-­‐scale	  facilities	  and	  cyber	  infrastructures	  acquired	  and	  operated	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  scientific	  research	  community.	  Unlike	  commercial	  infrastructure,	  these	  facilities	  and	  resources	  are	  often	  unique;	  significantly	  specialized	  to	  support	  aspects	  of	  the	  scientific	  discovery,	  analysis	  or	  computational	  enterprise;	  and	  essential	  enablers	  leading	  to	  critical	  breakthroughs	  and	  advances.	  We	  observe,	  however,	  that	  the	  traditional	  view	  of	  such	  facilities	  as	  independent,	  disconnected,	  standalone	  entities	  serving	  a	  single	  user	  community	  is	  increasingly	  obsolete.	  Increasingly,	  research	  communities	  form,	  and	  success	  relies	  on,	  large	  and	  flexible	  collaborations,	  drawing	  upon	  unique	  mixes	  of	  expertise,	  technical	  capability,	  and	  large-­‐scale	  cyber	  infrastructure.	  	  These	  collaborations	  are	  fluid	  in	  nature,	  often	  relying	  on	  decentralized	  models	  of	  leadership	  and	  cooperation	  at	  various	  levels	  of	  formality.	  In	  turn,	  this	  growth	  in	  the	  scale,	  dynamism,	  and	  multi-­‐disciplinary	  breadth	  of	  human	  research	  collaborations	  drives	  the	  technical	  need	  to	  harness	  significant	  ensembles	  of	  cyber	  infrastructure,	  to	  meet	  new	  requirements	  of	  both	  capability	  and	  scale.	  This	  need	  increasingly	  forces	  the	  research	  community	  toward	  a	  new,	  federated	  model	  for	  architecting,	  deploying,	  and	  managing	  such	  infrastructure	  resources.	  	  This	  cyber	  infrastructure	  model	  is	  notable	  for	  being	  fundamentally	  decentralized,	  broadly	  distributed,	  with	  individual	  elements	  operated	  by	  a	  diverse	  set	  of	  organizations,	  and	  subject	  to	  complex	  and	  competing	  usage	  demands.	  Further,	  such	  an	  infrastructure	  is	  typically	  never	  ‘finished’	  -­‐	  sustainability	  requires	  that	  evolvability	  and	  fitness	  for	  future	  as	  well	  as	  present	  purpose	  be	  key	  design	  considerations.	  Allowing	  for	  future	  enhancements	  and	  augmented	  capabilities	  (including	  those	  not	  yet	  conceived)	  may	  well	  complicate	  the	  system,	  yet	  is	  essential	  because	  scientific	  endeavors	  must	  leverage	  the	  latest	  in	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  information	  technology	  to	  keep	  pace	  with	  ever	  growing	  data	  sets	  and	  functional	  demands.	  Thus,	  we	  observe	  that	  forces	  at	  two	  distinct	  levels	  –	  one	  human,	  and	  one	  technical	  –	  drive	  us	  towards	  a	  view	  of	  research	  cyber	  infrastructure	  that	  is	  increasingly	  federated:	  intrinsically	  collaborative,	  large	  in	  scale,	  technically	  and	  administratively	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decentralized	  in	  nature,	  and	  capable	  of	  being	  composed	  dynamically	  to	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  increasingly	  sophisticated	  researcher	  requirements.	  Finally,	  and	  critically,	  this	  entire	  eco-­‐system	  must	  be	  approachable	  and	  ‘user-­‐friendly’	  if	  it	  is	  to	  succeed.	  It	  must	  be	  designed	  to	  interact	  primarily	  with	  non-­‐specialist	  researchers	  and	  administrators,	  rather	  than	  IT	  experts,	  while	  being	  open	  and	  accessible	  to	  its	  intended	  user	  community,	  typically	  from	  the	  Internet	  at	  large.	  These	  requirements	  pose	  significant	  challenges	  to	  scientific	  infrastructure	  cybersecurity.	  The	  creation	  and	  and	  deployment	  of	  security	  mechanisms	  and	  policies	  that	  enable	  confident	  use	  of,	  and	  organizational	  control	  over,	  all	  elements	  of	  this	  diverse	  eco-­‐system	  without	  creating	  disincentives	  to	  collaboration	  and	  the	  
creative	  research	  process	  is	  one	  of	  the	  central	  risks	  facing	  stakeholders	  responsible	  for	  the	  funding,	  construction,	  management	  and	  operation	  of	  large	  facilities	  and	  cyber	  infrastructure.	  
Catalyzing	  Federation	  with	  Attribute-­‐Based	  Access	  Control	  We	  describe	  in	  this	  white	  paper	  concrete	  work	  that	  addresses	  one	  aspect	  of	  this	  challenge:	  the	  creation,	  management,	  and	  implementation	  of	  rich,	  ‘audience-­‐appropriate’	  authorization	  and	  access	  control	  policy	  management	  mechanisms	  suitable	  for	  federated	  scientific	  cyber	  infrastructure	  in	  a	  decentralized,	  collaborative	  environment.	  	  We	  argue	  that	  such	  next-­‐generation	  policy	  mechanisms	  offer	  a	  powerful	  tool	  for	  securing	  national-­‐scale	  research	  cyber	  infrastructures	  such	  as	  those	  funded	  by	  NSF	  and	  other	  U.S.	  Government	  agencies	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  provides	  effective	  security	  while	  fostering	  wide-­‐spread	  use	  and	  catalyzes	  collaboration.	  These	  mechanisms	  can	  effectively,	  reliably,	  and	  transparently	  manage	  access	  to	  facilities,	  raw	  data	  sources,	  and	  partially	  analyzed	  datasets,	  while	  facilitating	  collaborative	  use	  and	  devolving	  decision	  making	  to	  researchers	  spread	  throughout	  the	  collaborating	  organizations.	  Pragmatically,	  such	  mechanisms	  complement	  and	  build	  on	  existing	  distributed	  identity	  management	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  Shibboleth,	  which	  are	  widely	  deployed	  in	  our	  target	  user	  community.	  Our	  observation	  builds	  on	  a	  long	  history	  of	  research	  within	  the	  security	  community	  directed	  towards	  the	  creation	  of	  trust	  management	  systems	  utilizing	  rigorous,	  logic-­‐based	  frameworks	  that	  are	  semantically	  well	  defined	  and	  amenable	  to	  formal	  reasoning.	  Such	  frameworks	  provide	  the	  structure	  necessary	  to	  support	  federated,	  decentralized	  operation	  while	  preserving	  local	  control,	  decision-­‐making	  and	  prerogatives.	  They	  further	  provide	  strong	  assurance	  of	  correct	  operation,	  together	  with	  clearly	  defined	  rationale	  for	  decisions	  made,	  expressible	  in	  audit	  logs	  for	  accountability.	  	  To	  realize	  these	  benefits,	  our	  focus	  has	  centered	  on	  the	  development	  of	  Attribute-­‐Based	  Access	  Control	  (ABAC),	  a	  specific	  example	  of	  a	  logic-­‐based	  trust	  system,	  and	  its	  deployment	  in	  two	  significant	  cyber	  infrastructures.	  The	  current	  ABAC	  system	  supports	  authorization	  policy	  expression	  and	  enforcement	  mechanisms	  that	  provide:	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• Formally	  grounded	  policy	  definition	  and	  interpretation.	  ABAC	  is	  based	  upon	  rigorous	  underlying	  theory	  and	  logical	  formalisms	  and	  semantics.	  Logical	  underpinnings	  are	  leveraged	  deeply	  within	  the	  system,	  while	  users	  are	  only	  exposed	  to	  authorization	  concepts	  appropriate	  to	  their	  role	  and	  domain	  of	  expertise;	  	  
• Capability	  to	  define	  common	  vocabulary	  across	  communities	  and	  organizations.	  	  Common,	  well	  understood	  vocabulary	  may	  be	  rapidly	  adopted	  for	  entities,	  resources,	  and	  privileges	  within	  common	  use	  cases,	  while	  preserving	  the	  extensibility	  required	  to	  support	  diverse	  specialized	  policies	  for	  specialized	  sub-­‐communities;	  	  
• Auditability	  of	  requests,	  authorizations,	  and	  policy	  changes.	  ABAC	  decisions	  result	  in	  tangible	  proofs	  of	  authorization	  derived	  from	  distributed	  policies,	  or	  explicit	  indications	  of	  what	  policies	  or	  insufficient	  privileges	  resulted	  in	  a	  request	  being	  denied;	  
• Library	  implementations	  suitable	  for	  incorporation	  into	  a	  range	  of	  cyber	  infrastructures.	  ABAC	  software	  provides	  a	  compact	  library	  implementation	  and	  language	  bindings	  for	  several	  of	  the	  standard	  programming	  languages	  used	  throughout	  the	  Networks,	  Grid,	  Cloud	  and	  Cyber	  infrastructure	  communities.	  Together,	  these	  capabilities	  provide	  a	  strong	  foundation	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  strong,	  secure	  access	  and	  use	  management	  capabilities	  within	  large-­‐scale,	  federated	  cyber	  infrastructures,	  while	  simultaneously	  facilitating	  the	  key	  objectives	  of	  flexible	  collaboration	  and	  local	  control.	  
Development	  Status	  and	  Lessons	  Learned	  As	  described	  above,	  ABAC’s	  capabilities	  are	  realized	  in	  a	  concrete	  implementation,	  colloquially	  known	  as	  libabac,	  that	  is	  suitable	  for	  incorporation	  into	  a	  range	  of	  cyber	  infrastructures.	  The	  ABAC	  software	  distribution	  provides	  the	  basis	  for	  meeting	  the	  current	  needs	  of	  a	  cyber	  infrastructure	  eco-­‐system	  relying	  on	  federated	  deployment	  and	  decentralized	  operations.	  It	  also	  lays	  the	  groundwork	  to	  support	  rapid	  evolution	  of	  national-­‐scale	  cyber	  infrastructure,	  anticipating	  new	  communities	  of	  users,	  new	  domains	  of	  inquiry	  and	  concomitant	  patterns	  of	  use,	  new	  classes	  of	  large-­‐scale	  facilities,	  and	  new	  patterns	  of	  access	  and	  connectivity.	  ABAC	  has	  been	  under	  development	  and	  use	  for	  several	  years,	  within	  significant	  cyber	  research	  communities.	  We	  briefly	  describe	  two	  major	  deployments	  of	  the	  libabac	  software.	  Our	  first	  use	  case	  is	  within	  the	  DETER	  Cybersecurity	  Testbed1	  (DETERLab)	  to	  enforce	  distributed	  authorization	  in	  support	  of	  wide-­‐area,	  large-­‐scale	  federated	  experiments.	  DETERLab	  is	  an	  internationally	  available	  infrastructure	  operated	  in	  support	  of	  experimental	  cybersecurity	  research,	  originally	  sponsored	  by	  NSF	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  http://deter-­‐project.org	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now	  sponsored	  by	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security.	  Our	  requirements	  and	  objectives	  for	  the	  DETER	  project	  provided	  initial	  motivation	  for	  the	  development	  of	  
libabac.	  The	  DETER	  Federation	  model	  realizes	  federated	  experimental	  scenarios,	  realizing	  distinct	  sub-­‐components	  of	  an	  overall	  experimental	  scenario	  as	  locally	  embedded	  experiments	  within	  multiple,	  distributed	  facilities,	  each	  contributing	  resources	  to	  the	  scenario.	  	  Each	  facility	  enforces	  authorization	  policies	  on	  a	  per-­‐experiment	  basis	  using	  ABAC.	  Resources	  managed	  by	  ABAC	  within	  the	  DETER	  federation	  range	  from	  basic	  computing	  and	  network	  facilities	  to	  dedicated,	  unique	  elements	  with	  unique	  use	  policies,	  such	  as	  hardware-­‐based	  modeling	  engines	  for	  electric	  power	  systems.	  Our	  second	  use	  case	  includes	  the	  prototyping	  and	  planned	  production	  adoption	  of	  ABAC	  within	  NSF’s	  Global	  Environment	  for	  Network	  Innovation2	  (GENI)	  project.	  The	  GENI	  project	  represents	  a	  major,	  multi-­‐year	  investment	  by	  NISF	  CISE	  to	  create	  a	  nationwide	  suite	  of	  infrastructure	  supporting	  "at	  scale"	  research	  in	  networking,	  distributed	  systems,	  and	  novel	  networked	  applications.	  Within	  GENI,	  ABAC	  will	  enable	  a	  diverse	  set	  of	  testbed	  control	  frameworks	  and	  resource	  aggregate	  managers,	  operating	  at	  institutions	  throughout	  the	  US,	  to	  coordinate	  policies	  governing	  computing	  and	  communication	  resource	  use	  by	  network	  researchers	  performing	  experiments	  embedded	  across	  the	  GENI	  infrastructure.	  In	  this	  capacity,	  it	  will	  replace	  an	  ad	  hoc	  first	  generation	  authorization	  management	  infrastructure	  that	  has	  demonstrated	  significant	  limitations	  in	  current	  use.	  In	  particular,	  a	  (surprisingly	  simple,	  yet	  surprisingly	  strong)	  motivating	  use	  case	  for	  ABAC	  within	  the	  GENI	  community	  is	  the	  requirement	  to	  allow	  researchers	  of	  varying	  skills	  and	  experience	  to	  designate	  hosted	  tools	  and	  portals	  to	  act	  on	  their	  behalf	  without	  obligating	  these	  researchers	  to	  upload	  secret	  keys	  or	  passwords	  to	  3rd	  party	  servers.	  ABAC’s	  logic-­‐based	  approach	  supports	  this	  requirement	  by	  allowing	  individual	  researchers	  and/or	  their	  supporting	  organizations	  to	  easily	  express	  formal	  statements	  regarding	  delegation	  of	  authority	  to	  ‘speak	  for’	  the	  researcher	  or	  organization.	  This	  intuitively	  simple	  capability,	  easily	  expressed	  within	  an	  ABAC	  framework,	  substantially	  enhances	  broader	  security	  goals	  by	  limiting	  risk	  of	  disclosure	  of	  passwords	  or	  private	  credentials.	  Beyond	  this	  initial	  example,	  ABAC	  further	  strengthens	  GENI	  security	  by	  implementing	  a	  manageable	  and	  understandable	  least-­‐privilege	  capability,	  providing	  for	  the	  first	  time	  a	  principled	  mechanism	  within	  the	  GENI	  architecture	  that	  can	  delegate	  specific	  limited	  privileges	  to	  a	  GENI	  entity	  without	  granting	  the	  delegated	  entity	  the	  full	  power	  of	  a	  user’s	  credentials.	  To	  date,	  our	  experience	  with	  ABAC	  concepts	  in	  deployed	  systems	  has	  demonstrated	  the	  generality	  and	  value	  of	  integrating	  trust	  management	  and	  authorization	  policy	  grounded	  in	  formal	  logic.	  Looking	  forward,	  our	  key	  goal	  is	  to	  enhance	  the	  intuitive	  approachability	  and	  usability	  of	  such	  a	  logic-­‐based	  system.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  http://geni.net	  
	   5	  








































Training Sessions | Aug 26 | 2014 NSF Cybersecurity 
Summit 
Tuesday, August 26 will feature a full day of training, available to all registrants.  All but the Bro session are half-day 
offerings. Seating may fill for some or all sessions, and pre-event registration for individual sessions is required to 
reserve a seat. Please register by August 19 to guarantee seating, and help us make final preparations. Direct inquiries 
to Craig Jackson (scjackso@indiana.edu). 
Concurrent Morning Sessions 
Bro Platform Training Workshop (Full Day) 
Instructors:  Robin Sommer & Justin Azoff (Bro Center for Expertise) 
Bro is a powerful network analysis framework used for security monitoring and network traffic analysis.  The 
user community includes major universities, research labs, supercomputing centers, and government and 
corporate organizations.  In order to gain the most utility out of Bro we encourage users to attend training 
workshops and participate in the greater online community. 
The Bro development team will deliver a full day workshop focusing on such topics as installation and 
administration, examining logs, learning out-of-the-box and custom Bro scripts, and the Bro Intelligence 
Framework. 
The morning session will focus on explaining what is Bro, how it is used, and out-of-the-box features. The 
afternoon session will focus more on hands-on exercises and programming in the Bro scripting language. 
Required materials: A laptop with an ssh client and VirtualBox installed 
Developing Cybersecurity Programs for NSF Projects 
Instructors:  Jim Marsteller, Susan Sons, Craig Jackson, Jared Allar (CTSC) 
Slides (PDF) 
Audience: Principal Investigators, Security Professionals, Center and Operational Managers, NSF Program 
Officers 
Team members of the Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure (CTSC) will present an interactive 
half day session on developing cybersecurity programs for NSF science and engineering projects. The session 
will be based on a cybersecurity planning guide (see, trustedci.org/guide) developed over the past six months 
with input from the Daniel K. Inouye Solar Telescope (DKIST) project and other members of the CI community. 
The purpose of this session is to offer a streamlined approach to developing comprehensive cybersecurity 
programs for NSF funded projects. The guide has been developed to address the information security 
requirements outlined in the NSF cooperative agreements. This session will include an instructional review of 
the cybersecurity planning guide and supporting templates, which can be used to jumpstart program and 
policy development. Some of the topics that will be covered include: 
● Building or Improving a Cybersecurity Program 
● Unique and Critical Science Requirements, Constraints, and Security Controls 
● Information Security Policies and Procedures 
● The Role of Project Leadership 
● Establishing a Risk Management Approach to Information Security 
● Defining, Identifying, and Classifying Information Assets 
● The Role of Risk Assessments within the Program Lifecycle 
● Baseline Controls and Best Practices 
● Topical Information Security Considerations:  Third-Party Relationships, Asset Management, Access Control, 
Physical Security, Monitoring, Logging, and Retention, and more. 
● Program Assessment and Evaluation 
While this session will be instructional in nature, it is also intended to be an interactive session to seek 
constructive feedback from attendees to further improve the guide.  There will be significant opportunities for 
discussion and Q&A. 
Vulnerabilities, Threats, and Secure Coding Practices 
Instructors:  Barton P. Miller & Elisa Heymann 
Slides (PDF) 
Security is crucial to the software that we develop and use. With the growth of both Grid and Cloud services, 
security is becoming even more critical. This tutorial is relevant to anyone wanting to learn about minimizing 
security flaws in the software they develop. We share our experiences gained from performing vulnerability 
assessments of critical middleware. You will learn skills critical for software developers and analysts concerned 
with security. 
This tutorial starts by presenting basic concepts related to threats, weaknesses and vulnerabilities. We will 
also show you how to think like an attacker. The rest of the tutorial presents coding practices that lead to 
vulnerabilities, with examples of how they commonly arise, techniques to prevent them, and exercises to 
reinforce you skills in avoiding them. Examples come from a wide variety of languages, including Java, C, C++, 
C#, Perl, Python, and Ruby, and come from real code belonging to Cloud and Grid systems we have assessed. 
This tutorial is an outgrowth of our experiences in performing vulnerability assessment of critical middleware, 
including Google Chrome, Wireshark, Condor, SDSC Storage Resource Broker, NCSA MyProxy, INFN VOMS 
Admin and Core, and many others. 
Concurrent Afternoon Sessions 
Bro Platform Training Workshop (continued) 
See full description above.  
HPC, HIPAA, and FISMA: Meeting the Regulatory Challenge through Effective Risk Management 
Instructors:  Bill Barnett & Anurag Shankar (Indiana University) 
Slides (PowerPoint) 
With biomedical research emerging as a formidable computing challenge needing support, high performance 
computing (HPC) is now face to face with regulatory compliance.  New language in government grants and 
contracts is or will soon be requiring compliance with federal cybersecurity standards for protecting research 
data, whether or not biomedical.  This half-day training session will familiarize the participants with relevant 
regulations, how they apply to HPC, the challenges they present, and offer a standards-based risk 
management approach to tackling them. 
Topics covered will include: 
● HIPAA and FISMA Demystified.  History and introduction to the regulations, what they mean for HPC shops, 
what they do not. 
● The NIST Risk Management Framework.  Managing information security risk (NIST 800-39), conducting risk 
assessments (NIST 800-30), security and privacy controls (NIST 800-53), and assessing the controls (NIST 
800-53A). 
● Leveraging the Framework.  Scoping, planning, implementing risk assessments, risk mitigation through 
selected security controls, documentation, ongoing risk management, reviews, and training, implementation 
at IU as example. 
Incident Response Training 
Instructors:  Warren Raquel, Randy Butler, & Patrick Duda (NCSA) 
Slides (PowerPoint part 1, PowerPoint part 2) 
Computer incident response is a required capability for any project or activity that is running internet 
connected services. This tutorial will provide basic information on setting up an incident response program so 
that the students can prepare their project team or organization for handling an incident investigation. The 
initial focus of the tutorial will be on identifying the processes, policies, information, and monitoring services 
that will be required to effectively respond to a security incident. This first section will additionally discuss 
investigation and analysis tools that might be useful for your investigations.  The second part of the tutorial 
will identify a collection of questions that the incident response team can use to guide them through both the 
investigation and the mitigation process. The final section will highlight several actual security incidents. Each 
of these incidents will be discussed in detail starting with how the incident was discovered and then continue 
through the investigation and mitigation process. The participant should leave the session with an 













































On August 27, Program Committee members and community members led 5 table talks during 
lunch.  We invited brief summaries of the discussions; these are included below. 
Incident	Response	and	Heartbleed	
Discussion Leaders: Rodney Petersen and Kim Milford 
 
The table discussion began with a clarification of the topic.  First, the Heartbleed incident was 
intended as an example and not the entire focus of discussion.  Second, there was another table 
discussion called Federated Incident Response which should probably be recast as how to respond to 
incident when federated credentials or resources are at risk.  The discussion then turned to individuals 
around the table sharing how they responded at a local level (i.e., campus, research organization, etc.) 
to Heartbleed and what policies and procedures that they have in place to guide their practice.  Some, 
but not all, organizations reported having a formal incident response plan and CERT or CSIRT that 
convenes for major incidents.  A major point of discussion was the lack of a clear definition or trigger 
for what qualifies as a major incident.  Most individuals reported that they pay attention to national 
information sharing organizations and sources for the determination of the severity of the incident. 
They also reported sharing information, as needed, up the chain of command so that there were no 
surprises if and when an incident moved from minor to major.  The group agreed that it would be 
helpful if there was some agreed upon or national classification system (e.g., similar to prior 
homeland security color codes) they could apply to their local situation or a national event.  There was 
considerable discussion about the similarities with physical events (e.g., active shooters, natural 
disasters, etc.) and the need for better integration with emergency management planning and 
response; however, there was also recognition that the physical threats and emergencies were easier 
to identify and classify. 
 
We also discussed the need for exercising incident situations, both locally and regionally or nationally. 
The REN-ISAC was generally recognized as a good source of information and an entity with the 
potential to fully develop a CSIRT capability on behalf of the Research and Education Community. 
There are some operational limitations, including communications (secure video and voice) and 
coordination with other entities such as the Higher Education Information Security Council and other 
research consortiums.  The REN-ISAC is viewed as a trusted source for information, although the 
reliance on email as the primary form of communication or information sharing makes it very difficult 
to consume information quickly or consult it later as a resource.  There needs to be more 
consolidation or synthesis of the information to make it more useful and to make the most efficient 
use of member time.  There was also discussion of the need to extend access to the information from 
the REN-ISAC to others (e.g., system administrators, network administrators,etc.) within the REN-ISAC 
membership community. Some members reported the current information sharing model is too 
limiting and inhibits the ability of some organizations to take appropriate action.  Trust remains a 
critical ingredient to having an effective incident response.  Trust is required at the local 
organizational level and across organizations which is why events like the NSF Cybersecurity Summit 




Discussion Leaders: Tom Barton and Craig Jackson 
 
● There is almost certainly a desire for information sharing around compromised credentials 
between the related parties. 
● Challenges and open questions include:  
○ Presently there is no standard procedure, structure, or protocol.  When this 
information is shared, it is entirely ad hoc. 
○ Who to contact at federated org and whether/how much to trust them, and how to 
broker those trust relationships. A question was raised re: whether a trusted channel 
would be necessary. 
○ Another challenge is time/effort.  An IdP may be sitting on a number of exploited 
accounts at any given time.  Sifting through these and communicating with the 
relevant partners is too much.  
○ Identifying the technical means to relay info, and standard of practice to qualify an org 
to participate in the technical means. 
○ Thus, automated and/or routine processes would be desirable (or perhaps necessary) 
to support federated IR. However, even with an automated process, data must be 
entered.  Do we understand what is the minimum effective communication?  
● Trust is likely a key ingredient of any solution.  Possible to cobble this together from 
peer-to-peer relationships, or leverage something like REN-ISAC?  
● R&E Federations should probably become trust brokers for this, in addition to other orgs 
unknown at this time.  
Enhancing	Research	Support	By	Enabling	a	Secure	Cyberinfrastructure	
Discussion Leaders: Ardoth Hassler and Kevin Thompson 
 
Funding from the NSF CC*IIE program, and its predecessor CC-NIE program, is serving to enhance 
research by improving researchers’ connectivity to the campus backbone, campus backbone 
connectivity to Internet2, and/or implementing a campus Science DMZ to enable collaboration among 
researchers, access to resources, including those in the Cloud. (See, 
http://www.nsf.gov/publications/pub_summ.jsp?ods_key=nsf14521) 
  
Some issues identified/topics discussed include: 
● The approach to implementing/running a Science DMZ is different from the “central IT” 
approach to running a “commodity” campus network. 
● Issues smaller institutions face include with lack of appropriately-experienced staff to deploy 
advanced networking, a Science DMZ, for example, and more focus on administrative and 
student needs than an overall understanding of researchers’ needs to obtain compute cycles 
and move big data. 
● Throwing equipment at a campus network doesn’t help researchers solve the problems that 
arise when research is competing with undergraduate network traffic. 
● An identified need for polices for a Science DMZ, e.g. that it is separate from administrative 
and general student use. [NB: some policy information is available at 
http://fasterdata.es.net/science-dmz/] 
2 
● A need to articulate best practices for a Science DMZ in a HIPAA context. 
● The community is working with NIST on guidance re Science DMZs and distributed firewalls. 
 
AWS	and	the	Impact	on	High-End	Research	
Discussion Leaders: Jim Marsteller and Barb Fossum 
 
Miron Livny, PI of the Open Science Grid (OSG) has been pursuing the use of incorporating AWS along 
with the Condor software.  He shared his experience in leveraging AWS for the OSG project. It is 
extremely expensive to move around petabytes of data per day so they have more interest in using 
AWS for data storage to help in moving the data around rather than the computation resources. 
  
Some bullet points from the discussion: 
  
● What kinds of negotiations needed to be made with AWS to implement these services? It’s 
very important to have an emergency back-out process and the paperwork should be in place 
to find a way to smoothly transition if such a response is needed. Service Level Agreements 
are also important.  AWS reliability has not been able to attain the availability that has 
traditionally been demanded of high-end data centers. 
  
● What does Amazon get from offering this service?  Good PR, student workforce, and in the 
future they hope to  develop a business plan to earn money from this endeavor. OSG will try 
to leverage these services for the future.  There are so many factors that come into play - the 
ability to scale, the security isn’t transparent to the HPC user, how do you request information 
on login etc to determine the health of the system? 
● How do you deploy to 50K cutters - done by software that will deploy by the 1K.  There are 
timelines for deploying large amounts of resources but can e done through the open science 
grid.  Using AWS as hot sites for back-up of data during transfer of data between jobs and 
resources.  
● Is there data on the failover?  There is a layer that does the job submission to some resource 
and it doesn’t matter what the compute resource is.  There does need to be knowledge of the 
resource so that the software doing submission can determine the way to talk to the 
resource- i.e. google, amazon, etc. 
● HPC and AWS:HPC is vulnerable because they use MPI and if one node goes down the entire 
job fails. If google or amazon used MPI their success would be nil.  When you get HPC nodes 
they guarantee a certain latency.  AWS offered HPC services are much more expensive than 
the storage services. 
Identity	and	Access	Management:	State	of	Practice	and	Future	Directions		
Discussion Leaders:  Mark Servilla & Jim Basney 
 
● Federated identity management is considered important, but not a hard requirement  
● No experience with InCommon  
● Perception that federated identity management is still a "hard" problem to solve 
● Globus Nexus is a recommended cloud-based solution for identity and group management	
3 
Improving	Diversity	
Discussion Leaders: Tony Baylis and Amy Apon 
 












































First Name Last Name Institution/ Organization Provided  
Andrew K Adams Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center 
Joshua Alexander University of Oklahoma / OU Supercomputing Center for 
Education & Research (OSCER) 
Jamie Allan NSF 
Jared Allar Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center 
Amy Apon Clemson U. 
Winston Armstrong San Diego Supercomputer Center at UCSD 
Justin Azoff NCSA 
Saurabh Bagchi Purdue University 
Steve Barnet UW-Madison - IceCube 
Bill Barnett Pervasive Technology Institute / Indiana University 
Tom Barton U. of Chicago 
Jim Basney UIUC 
Tony Baylis Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory / Rochester Institute of Technology / Air 
Force ROTC 
Steve Beaty NCAR 
Steve Beher National Superconducting Cyclotron Laboratory 
Greg Bell ESnet / Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
Emily Bell Rep. Susan Brooks 
Jordan Berg National Science Foundation 
Steve Berukoff NSO / DKIST 
Kate Bonvechio Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications / House 
Committee on Homeland Security 
Devin Bougie Cornell Laboratory for Accelerator-based ScienceS and Education -- CLASSE 
Jasmine Bowers North Carolina A&T State University 
Amy Butler George Washington University 
Randy Butler NCSA / University of Illinois 
Neil Canfield NSF 
Jaime Combariza Johns Hopkins University 
Leslee Cooper Indiana University / Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research 
Michael Corn Brandeis University 
Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld School of Labor and Employment Relations (LER), and National Center for Super 
Computing Applications (NCSA), University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign 
Jeannette Dopheide National Center for Supercomputing Applications 
Patrick Duda UIUC 
Don DuRousseau The George Washington University 
Walter Dykas DOE Office of Science 
Rudolf Eigenmann NSF 
Jeremy Epstein National Science Foundation 
Shane Filus Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center 
Terry Fleury University of Illinois / NCSA 
Barb Fossum NEES, Purdue University 
Phil Gates International Ocean Discovery Program 
Jill Gemmill Clemson University 
Kim Gillies Thirty Meter Telescope Observatory 
Bret Goodrich National Solar Observatory 
Steve Grandi National Optical Astronomy Observatory 
Robert Grossman University of Chicago 
Christopher Gullo Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory / Rochester Institute of Technology / Air 
Force ROTC 
David M. Halstead National Radio Astronomy Observatory 
Ardoth Hassler Georgetown University 
Victor Hazlewood University of Tennessee 
Randy Heiland CACR, Indiana University 
Elisa Heymann University of Wisconsin-Madison / Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona 
Bob Houtman National Science Foundation 
Craig Jackson IU 
Cliff Jacobs Clifford A. Jacobs Consulting, LLC 
Peter Jensen National High Magnetic Field Laboratory 
Ken Klingenstein University of Colorado 
Scott Koranda UW-Milwaukee 
Bill Kramer NCSA / University of Illinois 
Miron Livny Morgridge Institute for Research 
Paul Lordier California State University Sacramento 
James Marsteller CMU 
Celeste Matarazzo Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
Natalie Matson Committee on Homeland Security 
Charles McElroy Information Systems / Case Western Reserve University 
Michael McLennan Purdue University 
Kishor Mehta National Science Foundation 
Nathaniel Mendoza Texas Advanced Computing Center 
Pascal Meunier HUBzero, Purdue University 
Kim Milford REN-ISAC 
Barton Miller University of Wisconsin 
Tim Minick Gemini Observatory 
W. Clay Moody Clemson U. 
Christopher Morrison Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy 
Nick Multari PNNL 
Jose Munoz NSF 
Pat Murphy National Radio Astronomy Observatory 
Andrew Neff NEON, Inc. 
Anita Nikolich NSF 
Amy Northcutt NSF 
Joy Pauschke NSF 
Rodney Petersen EDUCAUSE 
Donald Petravick NCSA 
Francesco Pontiggia Brandeis University 
Sarah Portwood Indiana University / Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research 
Irene Qualters NSF 
Warren Raquel NCSA 
David Raymond Army Cyber Institute 
Ryan Richmond AURA 
Thomas Rieker NSF / DMR Facilities 
Brian Rohler NEEScomm / Purdue University 
Matthew Rosenquist Intel 
Jim Rosser Texas A&M University 
Doris Schiöberg ICSI 
Ryan Schmitz National Ecological Observatory Network 
Phyllis Schneck US Dept of Homeland Security 
Steve Schwab USC Information Sciences Institute 
Mark Servilla Long Term Ecological Research Network/University of New Mexico 
Anurag Shankar Indiana University 
Nigel Sharp National Science Foundation 
Abe Singer LIGO 
Robin Sommer ICSI/LBNL 
Susan Sons Indiana University, CACR / CTSC 
Kristin Spencer NSF / BFA /DACS 
Brian Stengel Technology Services (CSSD), Univeristy of Pittsburgh 
Denise Sumikawa ESnet 
Guebre X. Tessema NSF 
Vic Thomas BBN Technologies 
Kevin Thompson NSF 
Steve Tuecke U. of Chicago 
Heidi Wachs Gartner 
Ralph Wachter NSF 
Amy Walton NSF 
Jerry Wanetick Scripps Institution of Oceanography (SIO); UC San Diego 
Von Welch Indiana University 
Carol Wilkinson NSF Large Facilities Office 
Jim Williams Internet2 
Paul Wisniewski University of Wisconsin 
Shijie Yang Cornell High Energy Synchrotron Source 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix H 
Attendee Survey summary report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


















  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix I 
Tutorial Evaluation survey summary report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 





















